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Decades ago, countries with developed healthcare systems recognised an alarming 
tendency in the onset of nosocomial infections and bacterial resistance (the ability of 
infectious bacteria to withstand pharmacological therapy), therefore their prevention 
and treatment became a matter of increasing focus. However, the past two decades 
saw this becoming an urgent necessity all over the world due to the accelerated 
spreading of multidrug-resistant bacteria (i.e., bacteria resistant to antimicrobial 
agents which are traditionally effective) and the dramatic loss of antibiotic 
efficacy[1].  
Infection control is the set of prevention practices based on the scientific grounds of 
hospital epidemiology. The objective of infection control is to prevent the occurrence 
of healthcare associated infections and the spreading of multidrug-resistant 
microorganisms. 
Current infection control focused approach and terminology became widely used in 
hospital epidemiological practice after publishing the results of “The SENIC 
PROJECT Study on the Efficacy of Nosocomial Infection Control” [2, 3]. Results of 
a study performed by the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in three phases 
between 1976 and 1979 demonstrated that complete infection surveillance and 
control programs (ISCP) are efficacious and cost-effective measures for the 
prevention of nosocomial (hospital) infections. The SENIC project set the following 
four goals:  
1) To address the efficacy and cost-efficiency questions related to the completion 
of nosocomial surveillance programs.  
2) To describe the infection control program, the rate of nosocomial infections 
and to define the specific risk factors. 
3) To identify and present those items of the ISCP programs which can be 
recommended for widespread use due to their importance. 
4) To highlight those areas which should be further investigated with fundamental 
and applied research. 
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Multidrug-resistant pathogens and their healthcare associated infections, as well as 
the related Clostridium difficile infection (CDI) represent one of the greatest 
challenges healthcare providers have to face nowadays. Based on the results of the 
European surveillance network of clinically and epidemiologically significant 
pathogens obtained from invasive samples, the Hungarian microbial resistance 
situation is not favourable in a European perspective, as we are among those 
European countries where the rate of antibiotic resistance is higher than the average 
(EARS-Net, 2018) [4]. Data from domestic surveillance systems and situation 
analysis both confirm that antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is one of the most 
significant public health risks.  
According to the World Health Organization (WHO) 2016 guidelines on infection 
prevention and control, the average rate of patients acquiring a nosocomial infection 
in developed countries is 7%. In Europe, this translates to 16 million extra days of 
hospital stay, 37,000 deaths directly and another 110,000 deaths indirectly attributed 
to infection, as well as EUR 7 billion extra costs, assuming the direct costs only [5]. 
Depending on the patient population, mortality rate attributable to nosocomial 
infections varies between 12% and 80% [5]. 
The following recommendation is made in Section 13 of the Council 
Recommendation of 9 June 2009 on patient safety, including the prevention and 
control of healthcare associated infections [6]: 
“It is essential that the necessary resources for implementing the components of the 
national strategy are allocated as part of the core funding for healthcare delivery.” 
As a practising senior consultant in hospital hygiene, I have been involved in 
infection control for more than 15 years. Acting as Head of the Military Hospital – 
State Health Centre (MHEK) Department of Hospital Hygiene, I took an active part 
in implementing an evidence-based institutional ICP as director and responsible 
person of the project. In my work I had an opportunity to familiarise myself with the 
international IC guidelines and practices, and I took part in creating the national IC. 
Working in the MH EK as a unit head allowed me to obtain a broad perspective on 
the challenges associated with creating the institutional professional minimum 
criteria of IC, as well as with implementing them in practice. Furthermore, it has 
become evident to me that in addition to clinical particulars (efficiency, 
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implementation, acceptance), appropriate funding conditions are necessary in order 
to successfully establish IC. No successful IC can be created and maintained without 
the support of analyses based on high-quality clinical and healthcare economy 
evidence. Although several scientific questions remain open in the international 
literature, there are especially scarce local, institution-level data and information 
available on the IC practice, its efficiency, costs and healthcare economy aspects. I 
was looking for answers to these questions in my research described in the Thesis.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
II.1. Basic concepts of institutional infection control 
In order to discuss institutional infection control, some basic concepts must be 
defined and explained. These are as follows: 
a) healthcare associated infection: an infection which occurred during 
healthcare in the patient, a healthcare worker or any other person who came 
in contact with healthcare (like a volunteer assistant or a visitor); 
b) infection control: interventional activity aiming to prevent infections based 
on the understanding and analysis of factors involved in the onset of 
healthcare-related infectious diseases; 
c) surveillance: continuously operational information system which allows data 
collection, analysis, interpretation, feedback and intervention using criteria 
validated by standardised definitions and methodology; 
d) targeted surveillance: activity aiming to monitor a certain infection, risk 
factor, pathogen, antibiotic sensitivity/resistance, prophylactic or therapeutic 
drug use; 
e) nosocomial (hospital) infection: healthcare-associated infection acquired by 
the patient, a healthcare worker or any other person who came in contact with 
healthcare during the inpatient specialist care, which was not present upon 
admission even in an underlying form; 
f) nosocomial surveillance: surveillance aiming the onset, prevalence and 
detailed investigation of nosocomial infections, as well as the risk factors of 
developing infections; 
g) microbiological surveillance: tracing the occurrence and resistance of 
pathogens, targeted surveillance aiming to identify the occurrence of 
pathogens; 
h) antibiotic resistance surveillance: targeted surveillance aimed at the 
changes of antibiotic sensitivity/resistance of pathogens; 
i) surveillance of the use and utilisation of antimicrobial agents: targeted 
surveillance aimed at the consumption and appropriate use of the 
antimicrobial agents used by the healthcare institution; 
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j) antibiotic stewardship: planning, analysis and revision of the reasonable and 
cost-effective use of antibiotics administered for the prevention and curing of 
infections, as well as a set of methods used against the development and 
spread of resistance to antibiotics; 
k) infection control interventions include interventions administered to prevent 
the spreading of healthcare associated infections and multidrug-resistant 
pathogens, as well as to eliminate their accumulation. 
l) isolation: a set of procedures and rules to inhibit the spreading of infections 
and pathogens; 
m) disinfection (decontamination): a procedure used to prevent the spreading 
of an infection by applying distinct (physical, chemical) methods to reduce 
the number (sanation) of infectious pathogens in the environment (on 
surfaces, tools, objects, hand, skin etc.); 
n) environmental infection control: the prevention of healthcare associated 
infections by mitigating the risk factors originating from the 
microenvironment (air, water, surfaces) of the healthcare institution; 
o) critical surface: surfaces involved in the indirect transmission of pathogens, 
referred to as “frequently touched surfaces”. 
p) patient zone: an area of healthcare, consisting of the patient and their lifeless 
surroundings which the patient may touch or come in direct physical contact 
with; 
q) point of care: a site within the patient zone where the patient, the healthcare 
worker, as well as care giving, patient care and curative actions are present 
together, at the same time. 
r) epidemiological measures: mandatory actions implemented in order to 
prevent the transmission and accumulated occurrence of healthcare associated 
infections, as well as to stop any epidemic which has developed; 
s) Committee of Infection Control and Antibiotics: a multidisciplinary 
committee to steer and to supervise infection control activities, including the 
use of antibiotics. 
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II.2. Incidence of infections caused by nosocomial and multidrug-resistant 
pathogens 
Clostridium difficile (CD) is the most prevalent pathogen associated with the use of 
antibiotics. This pathogen can be held responsible for approximately 25% of all cases 
of diarrhoea developing in conjunction with the use of antibiotics, and its incidence 
has increased significantly from the second half of the 90s until now. According to 
the European Study Group for Clostridium difficile (ESGCD) surveillance study 
involving 38 hospitals from 14 European countries, incidence was 2.45 ± 1.8 cases 
/10,000 patient days [7].  
Results from a hospital study performed in 2008 involving 34 countries showed that 
among the nosocomial CD infection cases in Europe PCR ribotypes 014/020 (16%), 
001 (9%) and 078 (8%) are the most common, while the hypervirulent ribotype 027 
has a prevalence of 5%. Weighed mean incidence was 4.1 CDI cases/10,000 care 
day/hospital (value range: 0.0–36.3) [8].  
As reported by Zilberberg et al., the United States witnessed a significant increase in 
CDI related hospitalisations between 2000 (5.5 hospitalisations due to CDI/10,000 
inhabitants) and 2005 (11.2 hospitalisations due to CDI/10,000 inhabitants) [9]. 
Information on the incidence of healthcare associated infections and multidrug-
resistant pathogens (MRP) can be obtained from the data published by the 
community network (The European Surveillance System, TESSY) and the National 
Nosocomial Surveillance System (NNSS) [10]. The amended Commission Decision 
2002/253/EC laying down case definitions for reporting communicable diseases to 
the Community network under Decision No 2119/98/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council entered into force in 2012 and was published in Hungarian as 
well. The updated NNSS, launched in 2014 with an IT background provided by the 
Hungarian National Professional Information System (OSZIR), uses the European 
case definitions. 
Operational since 2005, the national surveillance system is an integrated part of the 
community network, except for the traditional “nosocomial epidemic reporting 
module”. NNSS results are published annually.  
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Regarding the time period between 1 January and 31 December 2018, 94 inpatient 
care institutions reported infections caused by C. difficile. This amounts to 70% of 
the inpatient care institutions (134 hospitals) included in the 2018 “Report on 
Hospital Bed Numbers and Patient Turnover” by the National Health Insurance Fund 
of Hungary (NEAK). In 2018, a total of 6412 cases of C. difficile infection affecting 
6153 patients were reported and analysed according to the data submitted by the 94 
inpatient care institutions. The tendency of healthcare associated domestic CDI cases 
is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Annual data on healthcare associated infections caused by 
Clostridioides (historically: Clostridium) difficile between 2013 and 2018. 


















2013 85 1,943,941 16,859,789 6182 31.8 36.7 
2014 90 2,051,141 17,476,277 6551 31.9 37.5 
2015 101 2,061,443 17,564,516 5754 27.9 32.8 
2016 95 2,010,385 17,293,212 4966 24.7 28.7 
2017 92 1,972,926 17,045,170 5404 27.4 31.7 
2018 94 1,977,696 16,935,562 5549 28.1 32.8 
 
Source: National Nosocomial Surveillance System [11] 
The NNSS module on healthcare associated infections caused by MRPs contains data 
of infections caused by pathogens specified in the relevant legislation and 
methodological letter (Table 2). 
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Table 2. Antibiotic resistance and brief name of multidrug-resistant pathogens 
Name of the pathogen  Antibiotic resistance  
Staphylococcus aureus  MRSA  methicillin/oxacillin  
Staphylococcus aureus  VISA  Vancomycin-intermediate S. aureus 
Enterococcus spp.  VRE  vancomycin  
Enterobacter spp.  MENB  ESBL-producing  
Escherichia coli  MECO  3rd generation cephalosporins and/or ESBL-
producing  
Klebsiella spp.  MKLE  3rd generation cephalosporins and/or ESBL-
producing  
Klebsiella pneumoniae  CRKL  Not sensitive to imipenem/meropenem and/or 
carbapenemase-producing  
Other Enterobacteriaceae  CRE  Not sensitive to imipenem/meropenem and/or 
carbapenemase-producing  
Acinetobacter baumannii  MACI  imipenem and/or meropenem  
Pseudomonas aeruginosa  MPAE  Sensitive only to up to 2 of the listed agents with 
antipseudomonal efficacy (piperacillin/tazobactam, 
ceftazidine, cefepime, imipenem, meropenem, 
ciprofloxacin, gentamicin, tobramycin, amikacin, 
aztreonam)  
Stenotrophomonas maltophilia  MSTM  Co-trimoxazol (sumetrolim)  
 
Tendencies in the number of domestic nosocomial infections can be concluded from 
the number of infections registered at the Hungarian institutions.  
Number of reporting institutions in 2018: out of 134 hospitals reimbursed by the 
National Health Insurance Fund of Hungary (NEAK), 87 were reporters (65%). 
(Range of capacity: 10 to 3472 hospital beds.) The report covers 96% of patients 
released from hospitals with active and/or chronic bed capacities, 91% of care days 
and 92% of reimbursed hospital bed capacities. 
The Military Hospital – State Health Centre (MHEK) is an institute created by 
merging 5 institutions in Budapest. Nosocomial infections based on microbiological 
culture methods were regulated under a surveillance institutional procedure, 
epidemiology specialist nurses followed up 2932 patients (6.18% of those who 
received care) in 2011, after investigation, 660 nosocomial infections were registered 
in 575 patients (1,21% of those who received care). Proportionate with the gradual 
increase in the number of active beds, the coverage area and the severity of cases 
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under care, 3675 patients (6.27% of patients under care) were followed in 2018 and 
after investigation, 1120 nosocomial infections were registered in 894 patients 
(amounting to 1.53% of all patients under care). 
Figure 1. Incidence density of healthcare associated infections caused by 
multidrug-resistant pathogens (number of infections per 100,000 days of care), 
Hungary, 2005–2017. 
 
























Table 3. Infection rate of nosocomial infections caused by multidrug-resistant 
pathogens between 2013 and 2018 















per 100,000 days 
of care 
2013 85 2,146,170 19,152,889 3837 19.3 22.7 
2014 93 2,062,773 17,517,968 3998 19.4 22.8 
2015 93 2,032,955 16,888,007 4187 20.6 24.8 
2016 92 2,051,564 16,950,222 4830 23.4 28.4 
2017 89 1,966,229 16,812,675 4935 25.1 29.4 
2018 87 1,937,986 16,419,281 5153 28.1 33.1 
Source: National Public Health Center [10] 
Figure 2. Occurrence of healthcare associated infections caused by multidrug-
resistant pathogens by the clinical type of disease manifestation in 2018 
(N=5442) 
 






















The cross-sectional study coordinated by the European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control (ECDC) is the largest European survey on healthcare associated 
infections (HAIs) and the use of antimicrobial agents. It is carried out every 5 years, 
involving those institutions which offer active inpatient care. The first point 
prevalence survey (PPS) was carried out in 2011-2012, and the second one was 
carried out in 2016-2017 [12]. According to the relevant Hungarian decree, the latter 
one involved every hospitals. 
Published data from the study carried out in Hungary in 2017 are presented below. 
Figure 3. Rate of infections confirmed by microbiological testing (ECDC, PPS 
2016-2017) 
 
Source: ECDC, 2017 [12] 
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Figure 4. Number of blood culture tests per 1000 care days (ECDC, PPS 2016-
2017) 
 
Source: ECDC, 2017 [12] 
Figure 5. Positive correlation between healthcare associated infections and 
frequency of sampling for blood culture (ECDC, PPV 2016-2017) 
 
Spearman rho 0.75, p<0.001 R2=0.487  
Source: ECDC, 2017 [12] 
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Figure 6. Relationship between the number of infection control nurses (FTE/250 
beds) and the proportion of antibiotic-resistant isolates (ECDC, PPS 2016-2017) 
 
p<0.001 
Source: ECDC, 2017 [12] 
Figure 7. Number of infection control nurses: median full-time equivalents 
(FTE)/250 hospital beds (ECDC, PPS 2016-2017) 
 
Source: ECDC, 2017 [12] 
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Figure 8. Number of infection control doctors: median full-time equivalents 
(FTE)/250 hospital beds (ECDC, PPS 2016-2017) 
 
Source: ECDC, 2017 [12] 
Figure 9. Rate of multimodal strategy application (WHO, 2016) in at least one 
HAI institutional infection control program of the investigated hospitals 
(ECDC, PPS 2016-2017) 
 
Source: ECDC, 2017 [12] 
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The cross-sectional study surveyed the frequency of healthcare associated infections 
(HAIs) and antimicrobial use in institutions providing active inpatient care at a 
specific time. The study also assessed hospital structural and procedural indicators 
supported by scientific evidence. The purpose of the introduced community-level 
cross-sectional study is to provide a uniform tool (method) for European hospitals to 
allow defining their quality development goals.  
The prevalence of HAI, weighed by country, was 5.5% (95% cCI: 4.5–6.7%) before 
validation correction carried out in acute care hospitals, similar to the prevalence of 
5.7% (95% cCI: 4.5–7.4%) measured during the 2011-2012 ECDC PPS [13].  
Estimated incidence rates from the data obtained are presented in Table 4. 
  
 27 
Table 4. Estimated incidence of nosocomial infections, 2016-2017 
Description Hungary EU/EEA 
Patient case number (patients) 20,588 310,755 
Prevalence (as per PPS methodology) 818 (4%) 18,287 (5.5%) 
Estimated incidence 3.5% (2.1–5.4%) 3.7% (2.4–5.3%) 
Source: Suetens, 2018 [13] 
II.3. Infection control: A historical overview 
The greatest challenge of the 21st century healthcare is halting the spread of 
multidrug-resistant bacteria [14]. The European Union Council recommendation 
issued in 2002 “on the prudent use of antimicrobial agents in human medicine” 
highlights the importance of developing strategies for the prevention of infections 
and containment of resistant pathogens [15]. 2010 saw the establishment of The 
European Surveillance System (TESSY) program. In 2009, the Council of the 
European Union issued its recommendation (2009/C 151/01) on patient safety, 
including the prevention and control of healthcare associated infections, which 
specifically highlights the importance of establishing infection control structures to 
be operated at a healthcare institution level, as well as the importance of establishing 
local infection control programs [6]. The Hungarian legislation has also been created 
considering the similar recommendations and the domestic particularities. 
Hungary has a history of over 40 years of hospital hygiene. The first legal act on this 
area of expertise was “Instruction 15/1967 (Eü. K. 11.) of the Minister of Health 
concerning the operation of public health-epidemiology physicians and committees 
at inpatient and outpatient care units” which entered into force in 1967. This decree 
was considered up-to-date at its time. It was followed up by the “Professional 
guidelines for the work of hospital hygienist physicians” (a publication) in 1970. In 
order to combat infections, both the legal act and the professional guidelines 
emphasised adherence to the existing hygienic rules. The same attitude is reflected in 
Instruction 32/1980.(Eü. K. 24.) of the Minister of Health on the prevention of 
iatrogenic infections. Reporting iatrogenic, or in modern terms, nosocomial 
infections was mandatory even in those earlier times, although their scouting was 
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“passive”. Furthermore, data collection was operated without using standards, 
therefore the reports yielded a database which was unfit for scientific analysis. 
Since the early 90s, a kind of a paradigm shift may be observed in terms of the 
hospital hygiene practice of healthcare institutions, which is possibly related to the 
initiation of healthcare reforms, i.e. the implementation of performance-based 
funding. Hospital managements needed to understand the actual situation of 
healthcare associated sporadic infections. This new perspective served as a starting 
point for creating and implementing cost-effective prevention strategies. Hungarian 
journals started to publish more and more papers on the United States CDC National 
Nosocomial Infections Surveillance System (NNIS) and the European HELICS 
programs, as well as on their possible domestic application. (The American NNIS is 
operational since the 1970s, currently as part of the National Healthcare Safety 
Network.) 
The principle of general precautions and regulations was created in 1985. This was 
triggered by the spreading of AIDS. It is intended to prevent transmission of 
infections by blood and bodily discharges between the patients and the care giving 
personnel. This was the first instance when precautions were aimed at everyone, 
irrespective of their assumed infection status. 
Starting from the 1990s, supplementary regulations based on the known ways of 
pathogen spread (contact, droplets, respiratory) were developed and implemented; 
this is the spreading-based approach for prevention.  
In Europe, the need for a unified infection control strategy was declared when the 
European Union Committee (hereinafter: Committee) issued “A strategy against the 
microbial threat” in 1999. The resolution highlights that antimicrobial resistance 
increases morbidity and mortality secondary to communicable diseases, leading to an 
impaired quality of life and an increase of additional healthcare costs. Community-
level action was substantiated by the Council Recommendation 2002/77/EC on the 
prudent use of antimicrobial agents in human medicine. This document declared that 
in order to develop strategies for the prevention of infections and containment of 
resistant pathogens, accurate surveillance systems generating valid, reliable and 
comparable data on the incidence, prevalence and modes of spread of resistant 
microorganisms as well as on the prescription and use of antimicrobial agents must 
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be established throughout the Community. Subsequently, several community-
established standardized and harmonised surveillance programs were created one 
after the another which allowed generating comparable data: HELICS (Hospital in 
Europe Link for Infection Control through Surveillance), EARSS (European 
Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System), ESAC (European Surveillance of 
Antibiotic Consumption). By now, all three systems have been merged within the 
unified European surveillance system (The European Surveillance System, TESSY). 
In Hungary, the NNSS operated by the National Public Health Center (NPHC) and 
its predecessors has been gathering relevant data on infection control since 2005. On 
its website, the organisation publishes annual nationwide surveillance data according 
to the European standardized methodology and case definitions, along with their 
analysis. 
General assemblies of the WHO have addressed the issue of AMR since 1986. The 
first global action plan was developed in 2001 (WHO, 2001). 
The next milestone in Europe was the Council Recommendation (2009/C 151/01) on 
patient safety, including the prevention and control of healthcare associated 
infections, which made it clear that healthcare associated infections are the largest set 
of patient safety hazards, therefore their prevention is a priority in terms of patient 
safety. The Hungarian decree regulating the national infection control was issued as a 
document harmonising this Council Recommendation. In Hungary, national level 
infection control activities have been regulated in terms of operational authorisation 
of healthcare services in Decree 60/2003. (X. 20.) ESZCSM of the Minister of 
Healthcare, Social and Family Affairs on professional minimum requirements for the 
provision of healthcare, Decree 20/2009. (VI. 18.) EüM of the Minister of Health on 
the prevention of healthcare associated infections and the professional minimum 
requirements and supervision of such activities, as well as among epidemiology 
measures in Decree 18/1998. (VI. 3.) NM of the Minister of Public Welfare on 
epidemiology measures required for the prevention of communicable diseases and 
epidemics. National, regional and institutional structures (Committees, surveillance, 
reporting and supervisory systems) and tasks, contents of the required infection 
control at an institutional level (corresponding to the level of progressivity and care) 
according to the type of hospital, as well as the personnel (staff number per areas of 
expertise) and material requirements for these tasks are defined by the relevant law. 
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In order to provide global support for preventive activities and activities to combat 
antimicrobial resistance, the WHO issued their updated infection control guidelines 
in November 2016, which offers evidence-based and expert consent-based 
recommendations regarding the key elements of healthcare provider infection control 
programs, for the effective prevention of HAIs and the reduction of AMR. 
The guidelines provide support for healthcare providers and care managers so that 
they can create their own infection control programs and action plans. The measures 
intended to correct and to improve the activities of the Hungarian healthcare system 
are created and implemented in line with the recommendations set forth in this 
guideline. 
II.4. Professional guidelines for infection control 
International professional guidelines of infection control are summarized in Table 5.  
Table 5. International professional guidelines of infection control 
International professional guidelines 
CDC Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare 
Settings 
Source: https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/pdf/guidelines/isolation‐ guidelines.pdf 
WHO Guidelines on Hand Hygiene in Health Care: a Summary. 
Source: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/70126/1/WHO_IER_PSP_2009.07_eng.pdf 
?ua=1 
Guidelines on core components of infection prevention and control programmes at the national and 
acute health care facility level. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2016,  
Source: http://www.who.int/gpsc/ipc-components-guidelines/en/  
 
National professional guidelines for infection control utilize the procedures 
summarized in Table 6.  
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Table 6.  Professional guidelines for infection control in Hungary 
Hungarian professional guidelines 
Information by „Johan Béla” National Center for Epidemiology, title of publication: “A nosocomiális 
surveillance során alkalmazható módszerekről I. és II.” (Applicable Methods During Nosocomial 
Surveillance, Part I. and II.) Source: http://oek.hu/oek.web?nid=1070&pid=1  
Letter on Methodology by the National Center for Epidemiology, title: “A multirezisztens kórokozók 
által okozott fertőzések megelőzéséről” (Prevention of Multidrug-resistant Pathogens). Source: 
http://www.oek.hu/oek.web?to=16&nid=444&pid=1  
Letter on Methodology by the National Center for Epidemiology, title: “A Clostridium difficile 
fertőzések diagnosztikájáról, terápiájáról és megelőzéséről (2017)” (Diagnostics, Treatment and 
Prevention of Clostridium difficile Infections). Source: 
http://www.oek.hu/oek.web?to=16&nid=444&pid=1  
Letter on Methodology of the Chief Medical Officer of Hungary on the prevention of wound 
infections during surgery (NNK 2019)  
Source:https://www.antsz.hu/data/cms92859/Modszertani_level_a_muteti_sebfertozes_megelozesere.
pdf  
Letter on Methodology of the Chief Medical Officer of Hungary on the prevention of pneumonia 
related to mechanical ventilation (NNK 2019) Source: 
https://www.antsz.hu/data/cms90553/A_gepi_lelegeztetessel_osszefuggo_pneumonia_megelozesere.p
df  
Letter on Methodology of the Chief Medical Officer of Hungary on the prevention of urinary tract 
infections associated with urinary catheters (NNK 2019) Source: 
https://www.antsz.hu/data/cms89838/Modszertani_level_a_holyagkateterrel_osszefuggo_hugyuti_fert
ozes_megelozesere.pdf  
Letter of Methodology of the Chief Medical Officer of Hungary on the prevention of blood stream 
infections associated with angiocatheters (NNK 2019) Source: 
https://www.antsz.hu/data/cms89792/Modszertani_level_az_erkateterrel_osszefuggo_veraramfertozes
ek_megelozesere.pdf 
Letter of Methodology to enhance the prevention and surveillance of healthcare associated infections 
via institutional and individual risk assessment Source: 
https://www.antsz.hu/felso_menu/temaink/jarvany/modszertani_levelek/KJ_modszertani_levelek.html  
Epinfo 2008; Volume 15, Issue 1: GUIDELINE FOR ISOLATION PRECAUTIONS: PREVENTING 
TRANSMISSION OF INFECTIOUS AGENTS IN HEALTHCARE SETTINGS – CDC 
GUIDELINE, USA, 2007. Source: http://oek.hu/oek.web?nid=1070&pid=1  
Letter of Methodology by the National Public Health Center on evaluating the risk of Legionella 
infection in environments and institutions where such risk exists, as well as on interventions to 
mitigate this risk (NNK 2021)  Source: 
https://www.nnk.gov.hu/attachments/article/950/Modszertani%20level_Legionella_2021.pdf 
Letter of Methodology by the National Center for Epidemiology on hand hygiene practice in 
healthcare and nursing social services (OEK 2010)  Source: www.oek.hu 
Letter of Methodology by the National Public Health Center on evaluating the risk of Legionella 
infection in environments and institutions where such risk exists, as well as on interventions to 
mitigate this risk (NNK 2021) Source: 
https://www.nnk.gov.hu/attachments/article/950/Modszertani%20level_Legionella_2021.pdf 
Tájékoztató a fertőtlenítésről. A járványügyi gyakorlatban és az egészségügyi szolgáltatásban 
alkalmazható fertőtlenítő eljárások kézikönyve (Information on disinfection. A Handbook of 




II.5. Legal background of infection control 
Hungarian regulations on infection control are summarized in Table 7. . 
Table 7. Hungarian legal background of infection control 
Council Recommendation 2009/C 151/01 of 9 June 2009 on patient safety, including the prevention 
and control of healthcare associated infections 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/patient_safety/docs/council_2009_hu.pdf 
Decree 20/2009. (VI. 18.) EüM of the Minister of Health on the prevention of healthcare associated 
infections and the professional minimum requirements and supervision of such activities 
http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A0900020.EUM.  
Decree 60/2003. (X. 20.) ESzCsM of the Minister of Health, Social and Family Affairs on the 
minimum professional requirements necessary for the provision of healthcare services  
Decree 1/2014. (I. 16.) EMMI of the Minster of Human Resources on the procedure of reporting 
communicable diseases  
Decree 18/1998. (VI. 3.) NM of the Minister of Public Welfare on epidemiology measures required 
for the prevention of communicable diseases and epidemics  
II.6. Management and economical aspects of infection control 
Based on data from a point prevalence study carried out in several European 
countries, Table 7 summarizes the economical and social burdens of healthcare 
associated infections per 450 million inhabitants.  
Table 8. Economical and social burdens of healthcare associated infections 
Healthcare associated infections 
 4.5 million infections per year 
 37,000 deaths per year  
Infections caused by MRPs 
 400,000 infections per year 
 25,000 deaths per year 
Healthcare associated infections 
 Approx. 16 million extra days of care per year 
 Approx. EUR 7 billion extra hospital costs per year 
Infections caused by MRPs 
  Approx. 2.5 million extra days of care per year 
  Approx. EUR 1 billion extra hospital costs per year 
  Absence from work approx. EUR 600 million per year 
Source: ECDC, 2008 [16] 
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II.7. Evidence supporting the efficacy of infection control 
Project SENIC was a milestone study confirming the efficacy of up-to-date infection 
control measures. This study evaluated the adherence to the US Center for Disease 
Control (CDC) recommendations and the results of these measures all over the 
United States. The study was based on the analysis of 500 medical charts selected 
randomly in 1970 and in 1975-1976. The key message of the study was that complete 
adherence to the measures recommended by CDC could have possibly prevented 
32% of hospital infections, however the infection control programs established in 
1976 were only able to prevent 6% of infections. The program helped identify those 
measures which were critical in terms of effective infection control. Surveillance-
based or control-based strategies turned out to be effective in different types of 
infections. One important finding of SENIC was that in hospitals where no infection 
control program had been implemented, the prevalence of hospital infections 
increased by 3% annually between 1976 and 1979 [3].  
II.8. Study results confirming the cost-effectiveness of infection control 
International papers published during the past two decades also demonstrate that CDI 
is associated with an extremely significant disease burden. Ghantoji et al. carried out 
a systematic literature search, identifying 13 relevant publications from different 
countries. According to their results, non-US-based studies showed an estimated 
incremental cost of $5243 to $8570 per case for primary CDI. It should be noted that 
neither of the papers discussed indirect costs [17].  
According to McGlone et al., the median cost of a case ranged from $9179 to 
$11,456 from the hospital perspective, $8932 to $11,679 from the third-party payer 
perspective, and $13,310 to $16,464 from the societal perspective. Most of the costs 
incurred were due to primary CD infection [18]. According to the systematic 
literature review by Wiegand et al., incremental cost of CDI ranged between £4577 
(in Ireland) and £8843 (in Germany), after standardization to 2010 prices. An 
additional significant finding of the authors is a high 30-day CDI-related mortality 
(ranging from 2.8% to 29.8%) in different countries. According to Craig et al., no 
publications are available on the cost-efficiency of therapies against CD [19]. 
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According to our systematic literature search covering the period until April 2012, a 
high methodological quality Canadian study investigated the cost-efficiency of 
vancomycin treatment versus metronidazole in serious CD infection, but no other 
health economy analyses are available [20].  
Results of project SENIC suggest that the cost-efficiency of infection control 
measures should be one of the drivers for spreading the use of effective infection 
control practices. Calculating with the 1985 price level, the annual cost of the CDC 
recommendations is 60,000 USD per 250 beds, which amounts to a total of 243 
million USD for all hospital beds in the USA. For the same period, the estimated cost 
of hospital infections was 4 billion USD (at the 1985 price level). Accordingly, the 
costs of implementing an infection control program are covered by a 6% reduction in 
the incidence of hospital infections, while an effectiveness over 6% yields net 
savings. In the homogeneous patient group based reimbursement system of the USA, 
every hospital infection means net losses. Infection control is the only effective 
measure to reduce these infections [21, 22]. 
Table 9. Costs incurred by multidrug-resistant A. baumannii infection, USA 
 Study design Study population 
Average cost 
(USD) 




386 patients with 
infection or colonization 
334.00 
Lee et al. (2007) Single centre, retrospective 
case-control (1996-2001) 




Recommendations on the prevention of multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii 
infections, which imposes the greatest patient safety hazard in intensive care, were 
devised by Munoz-Price et al. published in 2010. (Guide to the Elimination of 
Multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii Transmission in Healthcare Settings 
(Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology, APIC 2010)) 
The professional guideline recommended the application of the following rules: 
active surveillance, contact isolation/cohort, environmental microbiology testing, use 
of fluorescent staining, disinfection of surfaces, improved hand hygiene, reducing 
common tools to a minimum, multidisciplinary consultations.  
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Figure 10 presents the measures implemented in a tertiary hospital intensive care unit 
in three phases, between 2010 and 2013 [23].  
Figure 10. Measures implemented in a tertiary hospital intensive care unit in 
three phases, between 2010 and 2013 
 
Source: Munoz-Price, 2014 [23] 
Table 10 presents the results of the implemented measures.  
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Table 10. Success rate of infection control measures, USA 
 Total in-hospital CAICU Trauma-ICU 
 cases /10,000 care 
days 
cases /10,000 care 
days 
cases /10,000 care 
days 
Phase I 198 5.13 46 67.15 54 55.9 
Phase II 168 4.25 10 9.5 81 89.65 
Phase III 72 1.93 18 17.4 14 14.71 
The statistical difference between phases I and III is significant (p<0.001) 
Source: Munoz-Price, 2014 [23] 
Cassini et al. estimated the burden of five types of infections caused by antibiotic-
resistant bacteria of high public health concern (8 bacterial species, 16 antibiotic 
resistance–bacterium combinations) in countries of the EU and European Economic 
Area (EEA) in 2015, measured in number of cases, attributable mortality, and 
disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs). One DALY may be considered as the loss of 
one “healthy” year of life [24].  
The paper estimated the burden of five types of infections caused by antibiotic-
resistant bacteria of high public health concern (8 bacterial species, 16 antibiotic 
resistance–bacterium combinations) in countries of the EU and European Economic 
Area (EEA) in 2015, measured in number of cases, attributable mortality, and 
disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs). The proportion of disease burden due to each 
multidrug-resistant pathogen is shown on Figure 11 in the form of DALY per 
100,000 population. 
Among the European population, the disease burden caused by antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria matches that of influenza, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS combined. The 
disease burden caused by all of the 16 investigated antibiotic-resistant bacteria 
increased between 2007 and 2015. 
 Healthcare associated infections amount to 75% of the European disease burden 
caused by antibiotic-resistant bacteria. This is a significant problem, which can be 
reduced in healthcare institutions by appropriate infection control measures and by 
applying a prudent antibiotic prescription practice. 
 37 
Figure 11. Proportion of disease burden due to alarming multidrug-resistant 
pathogens expressed as DALY / 100,000 population  
 





















Figure 12. Estimated public health significance of certain antibiotic-resistant 
bacterial strains in the EU and in the member states of the European Economic 
Area (2015, DALY/100,000 population) 
 
Source: Cassini, 2019 [24] 
 
According to the opinion of the WHO Guideline Development Group, in summary, 
the positive impact and even the cost-effectiveness of infection control interventions 
can be assumed confidently, while the cost of interventions might still be high. The 
statement on cost-effectiveness is supported by the 2016 paper by Arefian et al. [25]. 
Literature search resulted in a Hungarian cost-effectiveness study: According to the 
cost-effectiveness study by Knausz et al. carried out at Petz Aladár County Training 
Hospital, Győr, and published in 2010, prevention of multidrug-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections is cost-effective: at the intensive care unit 
(ICU), an extra cost of HUF 17.3 million occurred versus prevention (screening) 
costs amounting to HUF 144,000, while the same figures at the internal medicine 
department are HUF 933,000 of cost increase versus HUF 60,000 [26-28].  
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II.9. Hungarian practices and improvement goals of infection control 
According to certain international analyses, comprehensive infection control 
programs allow prevention of 30% to 50% of healthcare associated infections. (1) 
Healthcare associated infections are the most common adverse events occurring 
during patient care, which impose a serious hazard on patient safety. (2) 
During patient care, several risk factors should be considered which might contribute 
to the onset and the high rate of adverse events, and to the increase of avoidable 
costs, thus significantly impairing the effectiveness and efficacy of care. 
In the current situation, the following challenges were identified beyond the factors 
considered for analysis during the creation of the new reimbursement model: 
 
the performance-based reimbursement system was introduced in 1993 and a general 
revision of fees has been overdue since 2000; current reimbursement parameters do 
not reflect the costs of infection control activities that meet the required standards; 
since 2000, the proportion of multidrug-resistant pathogens has increased 
significantly, therefore healthcare associated infections are an ever-increasing 
problem and burden both in terms of the patients’ life expectancy, as well as for 
service providers and the society. This is an especially prominent issue all over the 
world, which is associated with a continuous increase in care demands and costs; 
in 2009, personnel and material minimum requirements of infection control 
underwent a significant change: according to instruction 32/1980 EüM of the 
Minister of Health, which used to be in force before 2009, hospital hygiene 
departments operated with a staff of 2 to 3 employees, their activity was centred 
around the quarterly hygienic revision, there was no active surveillance at the 
institutions, and according to data from the NCE, in 2004, 24% of hospitals did not 
undertake any infection control activities as we define it now (5); implementing an 
appropriate level of infection control requires the necessary number of trained 
experts, who are not available yet at all levels of care; 
There are no nation-wide data on the magnitude of applying isolation protective 
regulations (it is not identical with the number of reported infections, it is highly 
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impacted by the willingness to take samples and the existence of an appropriate 
laboratory background, local surveillance activities etc.); national recommendations 
which serve as the basis for reimbursement calculations are issued in the spring of 




III. MY OWN RESEARCH IN THE FIELD OF INFECTION CONTROL 
Hereinafter I report five significant research projects carried out in the field of IC:  
1. Implementation and efficiency of IC in a Perinatal Intensive Care Center 
2. Learning model of acquiring appropriate hand hygiene techniques 
3. Disease burden and costs of Clostridium difficile infections 
4. Meeting the professional minimum requirements of IC in domestic healthcare 
institutions 
5. Institutional costs associated with the IC of multidrug-resistant pathogens 
These research projects evaluate the clinical evidence of the efficacy of IC (1) and 
challenges of implementing IC (2) in practice, while funding requirements of 
implementing IC at an institutional level and the related costs are also assessed (3, 4, 
5).  
In addition to scientific results, each of these projects intended to promote the 
implementation of IC programs in Hungary. IC is one of the major areas of 
healthcare institution quality management. Its successful implementation and 
operation requires a complex management attitude [30-32]. The WHO has issued a 
guidance document for the implementation of international IC programs, 
summarizing the most important practical actions to be taken. Table 11 presents the 
association between the research carried out and the major steps of institutional IPC 
development. The essence of the WHO multimodal IC strategy is that the 
development of key IPC elements (professional contents), like personnel training, 
back testing of results, communicating goals and feedback etc., should be 
harmonised and carried out concomitantly, in a parallel manner. One of its central 
elements is emphasizing the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of IC [33]. 
Accordingly, the individual projects show several overlaps with the main steps of 
IPC institutional implementation.  
Since the studies were carried out in different fields with different methodology, each 
topic is presented in a separate subsection for ease of understanding. These 
subsections detail Background, Objectives, Methods, Results, Discussion and 
Conclusions.  
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After presenting the studies (subsection Discussion and conclusions), I summarize 
the main results of the five research projects and discuss their practical importance 
and relevance in public policies.  
Table 11. Relationship between the research projects and the steps of 
implementing institutional infection control programs in practice 








































































































































































































































































































































1. IC program, provision 
of personnel requirements 
for ICP   
+ + 
 
2. Setting up IC 
professional guidelines +  + + + 
3. Personnel education and 
training + +   + 
4. HAI surveillance 
program +  + + + 
5. Multimodal strategies: 
change management and 
culture change 
+ + + + + 
6. Monitoring, IC audit 
and feedback + +  + + 
7. Human resource 
requirements, providing 
personnel requirements   
+ 
  
8. Providing site and 







III.1. Implementing and measuring the effectiveness of surveillance protocol 
NEO-KISS at the Military Hospital – State Health Centre, Department of 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Perinatal Intensive Care Center 
The next section is based on the following original publication: Kopcsóné Németh 
Irén, Bodrogi Eszter, Fekete Mónika, Nádor Csaba: Az infekciókontroll 
eredményességének mérése: Újszerű surveillance a PIC-ben. Gyermekgyógyászat  
2014; 65(4):283-289. [34] 
III.1.1. Background 
In 2009, a complex project was launched to reorganize the operation of the MH EK 
Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Perinatal Intensive Care Centre (PIC), 
aiming to transform care in a family-friendly manner, as well as to reduce 
nosocomial infections [35]. Requirements on hand hygiene, device use and surface 
disinfection were determined by infection control measures at the department, 
concentrating on points which are critical in terms of the transmission of infections 
(the WHO’s 5 moments with an additional preventive item 0) before entering the 
patient zone, then 1) before touching a patient, 2) before aseptic treatment, 3) after 
body fluid exposure/risk, 4) after touching a patient, 5) after touching patient 
surroundings). An up-to-date protocol on the use of antibiotics has been 
implemented, furthermore internal auditors were trained to educate personnel on 
infection control requirements, to measure compliance with the regulations and to 
develop them further [36-40]. The MH EK meets all professional minimum 
requirements of IC, an appropriate number of experienced epidemiology specialist 
nurses is available in terms of bed number, and an in-house microbiology laboratory 
is operated. Local protocols on surveillance-based interventions and isolation 
regulations were introduced in 2011.  
 
III.1.2. Objectives 
The research aimed at measuring the effectiveness of the IC program implemented at 




In Hungary, standardized methodology of infection control event follow-up is set 
forth by the NNSS launched by the National Centre of Epidemiology in 2004. The 
NNSS defines the frameworks of a standardized national database, which allows 
comparison between data from the participating hospitals, thus allowing their use as 
reference in following up nosocomial infections.  
At the time of the research, the NNSS PIC surveillance case definitions and 
composition of the collected data were hard to apply for PIC. Domestic reference 
data on PIC centres in terms of care quality indicators are incomplete. Therefore, our 
research utilized the NEO-KISS surveillance protocol, developed in Germany 
specifically for PIC departments [41]. NEO-KISS is methodologically different from 
the NNSS PIC module: it is patient-based, monitoring pre-term infants born with less 
than 1500 grams in 3 groups (<499 grams, 500–999 grams, 1000–1499 grams), 
follow-up only lasts until reaching 1800 grams in case of hospital stay, which is 
defined as a minimum of 72 hours (shorter periods are not registered by the 
surveillance), the applied case definitions and the collected device uses are specific 
to pre-term infants [42]. Depending on weight category, 150 to 250 PIC department 
provide data for the NEO-KISS about 1,300 to 21,000 cases, therefore 5-year 
cumulative reference data, which are updated annually, are sufficiently valid and 
reliable [41]. A detailed description of the NEO-KISS protocol is provided in 
Appendix VIII.1. 
Patient data were collected at the MH EK Department of Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology, PIC ward. Every year, 230 to 280 pre-term infants or ill newborns are 
treated at this 12-bed PIC ward. Almost 30% of the treated patients (80 cases 
annually) are pre-term infants with less than 1500 grams birth weight belonging to 
the group at high risk of nosocomial infections, most of whom are born in the 
institute. Data collection was performed over 6 months between October 2012 and 
March 2013.  
 
III.1.4. Results 
In the three weight groups, the individual infection categories and interventions were 
compared with the NEO-KISS data recorded in 2008-2012. The NEO-KISS data 
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present the incidence of cases in proportion to the total case number, while also 
providing the frequencies corresponding to the 25th/50th/75th percentile of the 
incidences measured at each centre.  
Table 12. Surveillance data from the Military Hospital – State Health Centre 
PIC ward in comparison with the NEO-KISS database 
A. Birth weight: <499 g Reporting PIC: 157 (MH EK) Total patient number: 1313 (1) Total days of 
care: 70,410 (101) Average days of care: 53.63 
 
Number of infections 25% Median 75% MH EK 
Total number of severe infections 682 2.33 7.97 14.29 9.9 
Pneumonia 102 0.00 0.00 2.15 0.0 
Blood stream infection 580 0.00 6.07 12.30 9.9 
Necrotising enterocolitis 83 0.00 0.00 1.72 0.0 
 
Days of device use 25% Median 75% MH EK 
Central venous cannula 28658 30.84 40.79 53.01 3.96 
Peripheral venous cannula 13526 9.43 16.57 29.46 15.84 
Intubation 24350 25.00 36.88 52.55 2.97 
Ventilation (CPAP) 29953 22.47 36.61 49.10 51.48 
Antibiotics 30762 33.94 44.21 57.63 11.88 
 
B. Birth weight: 500–999 g Reporting PIC: 221 (MH EK) Total patient number: 13,220 (19) Total 
days of care: 644,982 (546) Average days of care: 48.79 
 
Number of infections 25% Median 75% MH EK 
Total number of severe infections 4112 2.29 4.86 7.52 5.49 
Pneumonia 495 0.00 0.25 0.89 0.0 
Blood stream infection 3617 1.60 4.25 6.75 5.49 
Necrotising enterocolitis 640 0.00 0.70 1.34 0.00 
 
Days of device use 25% Median 75% MH EK 
Central venous cannula 204134 19.08 29.94 39.12 10.26 
Peripheral venous cannula 131731 12.23 18.93 27.05 28.94 
Intubation 130771 11.63 18.94 24.77 9.16 
Ventilation (CPAP) 278005 25.92 37.62 48.55 52.02 
Antibiotics 209811 24.19 31.07 38.92 19.60 
 
C. Birth weight: 1000–1499 g Reporting PIC: 234 (MH EK) Total patient number: 20,716 (20) Total 
days of care: 565,980 (481) Average days of care: 27.32 
 
Number of infections 25% Median 75% MH EK 
Total number of severe infections 1891 1.50 2.57 4.41 2.07 
Pneumonia 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 
Blood stream infection 1791 1.33 2.52 4.18 2.07 
Necrotising enterocolitis 259 0.00 0.06 0.68 0.0 
 
Days of device use 25% Median 75% MH EK 
Central venous cannula 103972 7.90 17.29 25.90 0.00 
Peripheral venous cannula 160022 21.20 29.40 36.22 23.70 
Intubation 33151 3.36 4.75 7.43 0.42 
Ventilation (CPAP) 132130 3.36 4.75 7.43 39.29 
Antibiotics 124534 15.68 21.20 28.30 10.19 
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III.1.5. Discussion and conclusions 
The 6-month pilot use of the NEO-KISS system revealed that the protocol is well 
usable in the Hungarian care system, data can be collected and recorded in a simple 
and easy-to-process manner. In the two evaluable groups, our infection rates were 
between the 25% and 75% quartiles, which indicates that the frequency of serious 
nosocomial infections at the PIC is similar to the German figures, which are not 
exceeded. Differences observed in terms of device use (much less central venous 
catheters (CVC), peripheral venous catheters (PVC), intubations and antibiotics, but 
significantly more non-invasive respiratory pressure therapy (Continuous Positive 
Airway Pressure, CPAP)) are well indicative of our care giving characteristics, and, 
in an indirect manner, indicate that our strategy modified meticulously as mentioned 
in the introduction allows us to achieve infection rates similar to the German figures. 
Our research demonstrated that instead of the missing national reference data, 
published NEO-KISS reference data enable the quantification of the care and 
infection control practice of each PICs with a high probability, which might 
contribute to the improvement of care by its objective markers. 
III.2. Learning model of acquiring appropriate hand hygiene techniques 
The following section is based on the following oral presentation: Irén A. Kopcsóné 
Németh, I. and T. Szabó, Optimization of hand rub volume assisted by automated 
visual feedback – coverage versus volume, in Second CEE Conference on Hospital 
Hygiene and Patient Safety. 2017, Semmelweis Foundation: Budapest.[43]  
III.2.1. Background 
MH EK PIC infection control surveillance program included a regular training of the 
department staff on the appropriate hand hygiene technique. Despite appropriate 
hand hygiene is one of the most prominent methods of preventing hospital infections, 
an observation of PIC personnel showed that they seldom followed the 6-step hand 
disinfection protocol by the patient’s bed as recommended by the WHO, therefore 
certain parts of the hand, which impose a significant risk in terms of transmitting 
infections by touch, were not disinfected in a proper manner [44]. Previous research 
demonstrated that appropriate hand hygiene practice becomes a habit by regular 
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training, the correct technique should be repeated even up to 5 to 32 times. PIC 
personnel, resident doctors and consultants underwent regular training on hand 
hygiene, organised 2 or 3 times per week, with each session lasting for 45 minutes 
within the MH EK. Hand hygiene trainings required a significant portion of the PIC 
employees’ time on duty, therefore one might wonder which methods could be used 
to speed up the learning curve of the appropriate hand hygiene habits. Semmelweis 
Scanner (HandInScan Zrt.), a device providing visual feedback on the appropriate 
use of hand disinfectant (and thus on the condition of the hands in terms of hygiene) 
was installed at the department, which allowed for an objective method of 
confirming the effectiveness of the hand disinfection practice employed by the 
workers [45]. In addition to answering scientific questions, the research helped the 
department personnel to practice and learn the appropriate hand disinfection 
technique.  
III.2.2. Objectives 
Investigating the speed of learning the hand disinfection movements which lead to a 
perfect result after applying 1.5 mL or 3 mL disinfectant (used at the MH EK PIC 
department on each occasion on average). 
III.2.3. Methods 
In 2016, 39 employees of the MHEK PIC department took part in this 8-week 
research. Each employee received a radio frequency identification (RFID) chip, 
which allowed their identification while maintaining their anonymity. After an 
introductory training, hand hygiene technique of the employees was reviewed before 
the end of each shift, following an RFID identification. Research participants washed 
their hands according to the WHO 6-step protocol, using ultraviolet (UV) labelled 
antibacterial hand disinfectant dispensed in 1.5 mL doses. Afterwards, the device 
made an image of both sides of the hands (Figure 13.), providing immediate visual 
feedback on the distribution of the hand disinfectant. The device stored this image in 
its memory, along with the unique identifier. During the first three weeks, 1.5 mL 
disinfectant was allowed to be used on each occasion, which was afterwards 
increased to 3 mL [46]. The amount of disinfectant used for hand disinfection was 
also recorded along with the images.  
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Figure 13. UV image taken on the result of hand disinfection and touch zones 
identified on the hand surface 
 
 
Effectiveness of hand disinfection was assessed using a Markov learning model. 
According to the learning model, two statuses may occur after hand disinfection: 
appropriate or inappropriate. Appropriate condition is defined as a 95% coverage of 
the hands with disinfectant. The system allows four transitions between the two 
statuses (e.g. from inappropriate to appropriate etc.), and according to the model, 
system status (the learning process) is characterised only by its current condition and 
transition, previous conditions do not affect its behaviour. Successful learning 
outcome was defined as two subsequent occasions of appropriate hand disinfection. 
Statistical calculations were made using R version 3.11 (The R Foundation for 
Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria) and MATLAB version 2015a (The 
MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA USA), as well as Stata version 14.2 (StataCorp. 
2015. Stata Statistical Software: Release 14. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.). 
Significance level was p<0.05, confidence intervals were calculated using the 
Wilson’s method.  
III.2.4. Results 
Demography characteristics of the employees enrolled in the research are 
summarized in Table 13.  
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Table 13. Demography characteristics of the participants of the hand hygiene 
training experiment 
Classification Physician 
Other healthcare worker  
 
 
Gender Male 3 0 
Female 7 29 
Dominant hand Left 1 3 
Right 9 26 
Age <25 years 0 2 
26-35 years 4 0 
36-45 years 4 12 
46-55 years 2 14 
>56 years 0 1 
Total 10 29 
 
The rate of achieving a successful learning outcome among workers over the 
subsequent measurements is presented in Figure 14. . When 3 mL of disinfectant was 
used, practically all participants managed to learn the appropriate hand disinfection 
technique. The incidence of disinfection errors on the touch zones of the hand are 
illustrated by Figure 15. . Neither the age of the participants (p=0.25) nor the hand 
size (p=0.90) had an impact on training success. During the course of the study, the 
consumption of hand disinfectant per patient day increased by 157%. Although no 
correlation could be demonstrated between the incidence of hospital infections and 
consumption of hand disinfectant per patient day, the number of events per care 
giving day showed a significant decrease during the study and the preceding year 
(2015/2016), as well as during the subsequent years (2017/2018) (Table 14. ).  
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Figure 14.  Rate of successful learning outcomes during subsequent 
measurements when 1.5 mL and 3 mL of disinfectant was used 
 
 
Figure 15. Disinfection errors affecting specific touch zones of the hand when 
1.5 mL and 3 mL of disinfectant was used 
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Table 14. Hand disinfectant consumption and the occurrence of infection 
control events in proportion to patient days  
    















































































































































2015 591 3853.3 153.4 69 9 12 8 
2016 530 2203.5 240.5 43 11 19 13 
2017 620 4764.0 130.1 32 15 12 5 
2018 698 6524.5 106.1 59 5 5 1 
2015-16 1121 6056.8 185.1 112 20 31 21 
2017-18 1318 11,288.5 116.8 91 20 17 6 
Incidence rate ratio 
 
  0.36 0.54 0.29 0.15 
One-sided binomial exact p  
 
  <0.001 0.026 <0.001 <0.001 
 
III.2.5. Discussion and conclusions 
Previous research confirmed that applying 1–3 mL of disinfectant is insufficient to 
provide appropriate hand hygiene. For individuals with large hands, some studies 
demonstrated an appropriate microbiological result when 6 mL of disinfectant was 
used [47].  
The study results showed that with sufficient repetitions, 3 mL disinfectant is enough 
to achieve appropriate hand hygiene, regardless of hand size [48]. During the study 
year, average daily disinfectant consumption increased by 57% versus the previous 
year. When the study started, 1 L of hand disinfectant cost approx. HUF 807, 
accordingly the estimated annual cost increase is HUF 304,800 when projected to the 
average 4336 patient days during the four years investigated. Assuming that hand 
hygiene training also had a significant part in reducing the incidence rate of hospital 
infections in the period after the study, the above cost increase seems to be negligible 
when compared to the hazard reduction achievable with appropriate infection control 
training. A limitation of the study is the absence of control group measurements, 
therefore the effect of other factors which might have had an impact on study results 
could not be investigated. Further limitation is that the cost efficiency of infection 
control training could not be exactly calculated due to missing data.  
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In summary, our research confirmed that while the use of 1.5 mL disinfectant 
allowed about half of the participants to learn the technique of perfect hand 
disinfection, the use of 3 mL made it available for practically all of the healthcare 
workers [48-50]. The visual feedback accelerated the learning process, and the costs 
related to the increased disinfectant consumption seem to be negligible when 
compared to the expected reduction in hospital infections secondary to the 
appropriate hand hygiene practice. 
III.3. Disease burden and costs of Clostridium difficile infections in Hungary 
The following section is based on the following publication: Kopcsóné Németh Irén, 
Kertész Adrienne, Strbák Bálint, Gulácsi László: A Clostridium difficile fertőzések 
költsége magyarországi kórházakban. Egészségügyi Gazdasági Szemle 2013; 
51(2):9-16. [27] 
III.3.1. Background 
CDI is an infection occurring as a complication of antibiotic use (and, as such, 
hospital antibiotic treatment) with symptoms ranging from mild diarrhoea to serious 
conditions associated with a significant risk of mortality. According to data from 
2011, its incidence is 8.81/10,000 patients released from hospital and 12.1/100,000 
days of care [51]. Considering international data, the real number of cases might be 
significantly higher than the 1803 cases reported in 2011, possibly amounting up to 
7000 cases per year [9, 52]. International studies report that CDI is associated with a 
high cost burden and disease burden, however, there were no Hungarian data 
available on the incremental costs of institutional CDI.  
III.3.2. Objectives 
The study aimed to analyse the incremental hospital cost burdens of CDI, with 
specific regard to severe cases recurring several times. 
III.3.3. Methods 
A retrospective study was performed for 2011, involving two hospitals in Budapest. 
The study reviewed hospital files of adult (aged 18+ years) CDI patients who were 
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admitted because of CDI or had their CDI confirmed during their hospital stay. 
Retrospectively, 151 patients were enrolled from study initiation.  
Incremental costs were estimated as follows: costs related to patient isolation were 
calculated as per the institutional quality system procedures, separately for the ICU 
and for the internal medicine departments. Costs for both the standard and the CDI-
related special isolation protocol were calculated based on the current costs of the 
required interventions and the materials used, from the institution’s perspective. In 
case of missing data, the extent of interventions and their demand of materials were 
assessed by an expert’s review (e.g., hand disinfection; protective equipment: use of 
gloves, gowns, masks; environmental measures: disinfection of critical surfaces, 
daily cleaning for disinfection, disinfection when care has ended; other activities: 
diaper requirement, bed disinfection, washing the patient). In addition to isolation 
costs, the costs of the applied medicines and the investigations performed were also 
calculated according to the current social security reimbursement rules. Incremental 
costs were calculated by the difference in the daily costs of mean time in isolation, 
standard isolation and CDI-warranted contact isolation. Patient demographics, the 
conditions when they contracted the disease, as well as their hospital treatment 
outcomes were also recorded during the study.   
III.3.4. Results 
Records from 151 CDI patients were investigated in total. 58.3% of patients were 
women, the average age was 71.4 (SD=15.20) years and the average body weight 
was 68.9 (SD=16.23) kg. On average, patients were admitted because of CDI on 1.4 
occasions (SD=0.70). 105 patients (69.54%) were admitted once, 36 patients 
(23.84%) were admitted twice, while 7 patients (4.64%), 2 patients (1.32%) and 1 
patients (0.66%) were admitted three, four and five times, respectively. Upon 1st 
admission, 62 patients (41%), 62 patients (41%), 18 patients (12%) and 9 patients 
(6%) were admitted in mild, moderate, severe and life-threatening condition, 
respectively, out of the 151 patients. Severity distribution was similar in patients who 
underwent repeated admissions. Among those who were first admitted in mild 
condition (62 patients), 5 patients (8.1%) died, while the same was 13 patients 
(21%), 3 patients (16.7%) and 8 patients (88.9%) among those admitted in moderate 
(62 patients), severe (18 patients) and life-threatening condition (9 patients), 
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respectively. From the 151 patients with CD infection, 92 patients (60.93%) were 
discharged as cured and 30 patients (19.87%) with remaining symptoms, while 29 
patients (19.20%) died. 14 deaths (48.30%) could be related with CD infection.  
Based on the questionnaire, the total number of days spent in isolation was 17.56 
days (SD=13.36 days) for 2011. An average episode was 12.57 days long (SD=8.31), 
one CDI patient was admitted to hospital 1.4 times on average. However, 10 out of 
the 151 patients underwent hospital admission three or more times. The 151 
investigated patients had 211 admissions in 2011, meaning 221 isolations because 
certain patients were isolated at several departments during one admission. Table 15. 
,   
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Table 16.  and Table 17.  present the hospital treatment costs of a single hospital 
episode of a generic CDI patient, hospital treatment of a generic patient calculated 
with multiple admissions and the hospital treatment of a recurrent patient with three 
or more repeated admissions at internal medicine, intensive care and surgery 
departments.  
Table 15. Average (incremental) costs of an average hospital episode of a CD-
infected patient for 2011 
Source of costs CDI incremental 





costs at an intensive 
care unit (gross HUF) 
CDI incremental 
costs at a department 




 5943 11,886 8915 
Hygiene costs
a
 66,478 89,098 77,788 
Cost of medicines 42,464 42,464 42,464 
Laboratory costs 12,673 12,673 12,673 
Total 127,558 156,121 141,840 
a
Difference between standard and CDI contact isolation 
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Table 16. Average (incremental) costs of the hospital stay of a CD-infected 
patient with several admissions for 2011 
Source of costs CDI incremental 





costs at an intensive 
care unit (gross HUF) 
CDI incremental 
costs at a department 
of surgery (gross 
HUF) 
Nurse time* 8304 16,607 12,455 
Hygiene costs* 92,901 124,509 108,705 
Cost of medicines 59,449 59,449 59,449 
Laboratory costs 17,750 17,750 17,750 
Total 178,404 218,315 198,360 
* Difference between standard and CDI contact isolation 
Table 17. Average (incremental) costs of the hospital stay of a CD-infected 
patient admitted three or more times, for 2011 
Source of costs CDI incremental 





costs at an intensive 
care unit, gross HUF 
CDI incremental 
costs at a surgery 
ward, gross HUF 
Nurse time* 21,560 43,119 32,340 
Hygiene costs* 241,668 347,723 294,696 
Cost of medicines 88,076 88,076 88,076 
Laboratory costs 28,128 28,128 28,128 
Total 379,432 507,046 443,240 
* Difference between standard and CDI contact isolation 
III.3.5. Discussion and conclusions 
In 2011, one CDI case increased the cost of care by HUF 100,000 to 200,000 on 
average. CDI incremental costs per institution may be estimated as HUF 130,000 to 
150,000 / CDI-related hospital admission. In case of third-time or any subsequent 
CD infections, costs are HUF 400,000 to 500,000 /patient/year. Costs are strongly 
dependent on the time required for care and the number minutes required by care of 
patients with CD infection. Care of CD-infected patients require significant nurse 
time capacities, which is a significant factor since hospitals already face labour 
shortage. 
The most important limitations of our study is that the survey was made with a small 
case number, involving two hospitals in total. Data were collected retrospectively, 
the number of interventions and the time required were based on experts’ estimates. 
Only the nurse time costs were estimated during cost calculation, while the 
physician’s time cost had not been quantified. We did not measure the costs of 
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leaving empty beds besides the patients due to CDI isolation, which is likely to be a 
significant factor of cost. Our research did not cover the patients’ quality of life 
burden either, therefore the available information are insufficient to carry out CDI-
related cost-effectiveness analyses.  
III.4. Investigation on meeting the minimum requirements of infection control 
in domestic healthcare institutions 
III.4.1. Background 
Personnel and material minimum requirements of infection control in Hungary are 
regulated by Decree 20/2009. (VI. 18.) EüM of the Minister of Health on the 
prevention of healthcare associated infections and the professional minimum 
requirements and supervision of such activities. In addition to outlining the structures 
to be deployed at the national level, the decree defines the expected professional 
minimum requirements at the institutional level based on the size of healthcare 
providers and the type of departments operated by the providers. In terms of 
personnel requirements the decree defines the minimum warranted number and 
qualification of managers responsible for infection control management, 
epidemiology and infectology associates, public health/epidemiology supervisors and 
epidemiology specialist nurses, as well as the minimum material requirements of 
infection control, depending on the size of the specific healthcare providers and the 
profile of the departments operated. For more than 15 years the National Public 
Health Center and its predecessor institutions have been collecting annual data on the 
compliance of Hungarian in-patient care institutions with personnel and material 
minimum requirements, along with data (microbiology testing carried out, hospital 
infections) on the hospital epidemiology activities of the institutions. 
III.4.2. Objectives 
To investigate the relationship between meeting the infection control minimum 
requirements and the size of the institution, as well as with the incidence of hospital 
infections.  
Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
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We hypothesise that the incidence of hospital infections is lower in institutions where 
the minimum requirements of infection control are met. In institutions where there is 
a change in terms of compliance with the minimum requirements of infection 
control, the incidence of hospital infections changes the opposite way (i.e., where 
minimum requirements are met, the number of hospital infections is reduced). 
Hypothesis (H2) 
Since meeting the minimum requirements of infection control are costly, we 
hypothesise that the savings obtained by a reduced case number will balance out the 
costs of meeting the minimum criteria in institutions with a higher patient turnover. 
Therefore, we hypothesise that institutions with a higher patient turnover are more 
likely to meet the minimum requirements. 
III.4.3. Methods 
Data collection 
In the course of our research we have analysed the Year 2017 and Year 2018 
hospital-epidemiology reports of 103 Hungarian institutions submitted in compliance 
with Decree 20/2009. (VI. 18.) EüM. Personnel requirements of hospitals with over 
400 beds are shown in Table 18, while the minimum requirements for high-
progressivity institutions with over 400 beds and special hospital departments 
(perinatal intensive care centre progressivity level II or III, intensive care unit 
progressivity level II or III, department of surgery progressivity level III) are 
presented in Table 19.  
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Table 18. Personnel minimum requirements of infection control at inpatient 
institutions with over 400 beds  
Minimum 
requirements for the 
healthcare provider 








specialist in public health/epidemiology, 
specialist in preventive medicine and public health, 
other specialist who has earned professional 
advanced training in hospital hygiene and infection 
control 
Associate 1 hospital 
epidemiologist (full-
time if bed number 
exceeds 800) 
specialist in public health/epidemiology; 
specialist in preventive medicine and public health; 
professional expertise in infection control obtained in 
specialist inpatient care of at least 5 years: 
expert with university degree in medicine or other 
health sciences, - public health/epidemiological 
inspector, - public health/epidemiology supervisor, - 
public health inspector, - public health expert with 
degree earned in public health supervisor studies, - 
public health expert with degree earned in 
epidemiology studies 
 1 infectologist infectology specialist  
specialist in infectious diseases 
 1 public 
health/epidemiological 
inspector or public 
health/epidemiology 
supervisor 
public health/epidemiological inspector  
public health/epidemiology supervisor, - public 
health inspector,  
public health expert with degree earned in public 
health supervisor studies,  
public health expert with degree earned in 
epidemiology studies, 
 at least 2 specialist 
nurses in 
epidemiology, with 1 
more after every 300 
additional beds 
specialist nurse in clinical epidemiology,  
specialist nurse in epidemiology,  
qualified nurse 
Source: Decree 20/2009. (VI. 18.) EüM 
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Table 19. Personnel minimum requirements for infection control in high-














specialist in public health/epidemiology,  
specialist in preventive medicine and public health.  
other specialist who has earned professional 
advanced training in hospital hygiene and infection 
control 
Associate 1 hospital 
epidemiologist (full-
time if bed number 
exceeds 800) 
specialist in public health/epidemiology, 
specialist in preventive medicine and public health.  
other specialist who has earned professional 
advanced training in hospital hygiene and infection 
control 
 1 infectologist infectology specialist  
specialist in infectious diseases, 
 1 public 
health/epidemiological 
inspector or public 
health/epidemiology 
supervisor (2 in case of 
universities) 
public health/epidemiological inspector  
public health/epidemiology supervisor,  
public health inspector,  
public health expert with degree earned in public 
health supervisor studies,  
public health expert with degree earned in 
epidemiology studies, 
 at least 2 specialist 
nurses in epidemiology, 
with 1 more after every 
300 additional beds 
specialist nurse in clinical epidemiology,  
specialist nurse in epidemiology,  
qualified nurse 
Source: Decree 20/2009. (VI. 18.) EüM 
Data 
Data show the specific year, institution ID, as well as the category, patient turnover, 
infection control events and compliance with the personnel minimum requirements 
of the institution. Contents of each variable are detailed in Table 20.  
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Table 20. Compliance with the minimum criteria in domestic inpatient 




Hospital Hospital ID 1-103 
Hospital category 1 Rural active hospital, <400 beds 
2 Rural active hospital, >400 beds 
3 Municipal chronic hospital 
4 County hospital 
5 County-level hospital in Budapest  
6 Regional rural hospital 
7 Regional hospital in Budapest 
8 University clinic 
9 Regional rural chronic hospital 
10 Regional chronic hospital in 
Budapest 
11 National institute (paediatric) 
12 National institute (adults) 
Average bed number In 2017–2018 
Number of patients Annual patient turnover 
Number of days of care Annual patient turnover 
Microbiology tests Total / year 
Blood cultures Total / year 
Clostridium difficile (CD) infection Total cases / year 
Multiresistant staphylococcus aureus 
(MRSA) infection 
Colonised cases / year 
Symptomatic cases / year 
Vancomycin-resistant enterococcus 
(VRE) infection 
Colonised cases / year 
Symptomatic cases / year 
Gram+ infection Colonised cases / year 
Symptomatic cases / year 
Multidrug-resistant pathogen (MRP) 
infection 
Total symptomatic cases / year 
Number of beds 1<400 beds 
2>400 beds 
3 Highlighted institutions 
Epidemiologist physicians Full-time personnel  
Part-time personnel  
Supervisors Full-time personnel  
Part-time personnel 
Specialist nurse in epidemiology Full-time personnel  
Part-time personnel 
Infectologist Full-time personnel  
 Part-time personnel  
Meets minimum criteria 1 Meets all criteria 
2 Meets the number of physicians 
3 Meets the number of supervisors 
4 Meets the number of epidemiologists 
5 Meets the number of infectologists 
 
Patient turnover data, infection control events and their rate of occurrence, as well as 




The effect of meeting the minimum requirements for infection control on the 
frequency of hospital infections is investigated using panel data regression method 
(Poisson random effects model), while analysing the correlations of meeting the 
infection control minimum requirements and the incidence density of events (first 
hypothesis, H1). The dependent variable is the annual incidence density of hospital 
infections (case number / 10,000 days of care), the predictor variable is the change in 
the infection control minimum requirements (epidemiologist physicians, supervisors, 
specialist nurses, infectologists, all conditions, number of minimum criteria met), the 
parameter investigated in the hypothesis is the predictor variable coefficient 
(Minimum requirement, ). The hypothesis is that Minimum requirement <0, i.e., the 
frequency of infection control events is reduced once the minimum conditions are 
met.  
Correlations between compliance with the minimum criteria and the institution 
category (second hypothesis, H2) are also investigated using panel regression 
(logistic regression, random effects model, or random effect ordered logit model). 
The hypothesis is that larger institutions are more likely to comply with minimum 
requirements. The dependent variable is the binary variable indicating whether the 
minimum requirements are met (minimum requirement met/not met). The hypothesis 
is tested based on the coefficient representing the size of the institution (annual 
number of days of care, ). Hypothesis: number of days of care>0.  
III.4.4. Results 
The annual number of days of care was 178,474 in the 103 institutions, with a 
standard deviation of 167,710. (Median 118,371, interquartile range: 72,455 – 
213,413). Compliance with minimum requirements is presented in Figure 16. A 
slight increase was observed in terms of all personnel requirements between 2017 
and 2018. However, the change was not unequivocally positive in all institutions. 
While some institutions demonstrated an improvement in compliance with the 
requirements (14 out of 103; 13.6%), others presented a decline (10 out of 103; 
9.7%). One institution presented change in both ways, and there was no change in 
most of the institutions (78 out of 103; 75.7%) (Table 21).  
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Figure 16. Compliance with infection control minimum requirements in 
Hungarian inpatient institutions (2017/2018) 
 





Specialist nurse Infectologist 
1 / 103 - -     
1 / 103     - - 
2 / 103 -       
3 / 103   -     
2 / 103     -   
1 / 103       - 
78 / 103         
1 / 103 +   -   
2 / 103       + 
5 / 103     +   
2 / 103   +     
1 / 103   + +   
2 / 103 + +     
1 / 103 + +   + 
1 / 103 + + + + 
- Decline: the minimum requirement is no longer met in 2018 while it was met in 2017 
 + Improvement: the minimum requirement is met in 2018 while it was not met in 2017  
Empty cells: no change between 2017 and 2018. 
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Table 22 shows the number of institutions by the number of minimum requirements 
met. Out of the 103 institutions, none of the minimum requirements were met in 10 
(9.7%) institutions in 2017 and in 9 institutions (8.7%) in 2018. All requirements 
were met in 2 institutions (1.9%) in 2017 and in 5 institutions (4.9%) in 2018.  
Table 22. Number of institutions according to the number of minimum 
requirements met (2017/2018) 
Number of minimum 
requirements met 
Number of institutions 2017 
(n=103) 
Number of institutions 2018 
(n=103) 
0 10 9 
1 30 30 
2 34 30 
3 27 29 
4 2 5 
 
Figure 17 shows the incidence density distribution of hospital infections at the 103 
institutions per pathogen for the basis year 2017. All pathogens were characterised 
by a significantly right-tilted data distribution, and some institutions presented 
excessively high values. Regression study results are presented in tables (Table 23.  
Table 24.  Table 25. ). Coefficients describe relative frequencies for years 2018 and 
2017. 
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Figure 17. Distribution in the incidence density of hospital infections in 103 
domestic institutions (2017) 
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Epidemiologist 0.58** 0.55** 0.57* 0.53*** 0.59 0.79 0.61 0.48*** 0.62** 0.55*** 0.60** 
Inspector 1.01 0.88 0.94 0.83 2.84* 2.89* 2.72** 0.98 1.43 1.07 1.21 
Nurse 0.87 1.04 0.68 0.85 1.2 1 1.2 1.11 0.86 0.95 0.76 
Infectologist 0.77 1.90* 1.26 1.41 2.35* 2.28 2.25* 2.37*** 1.35 1.65** 1.07 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001, relative frequencies (2018 vs. 2017)  
Table 24. Correlation between the combined compliance with minimum requirements and the incidence density of hospital infections 
























met 0.34*** 0.46 0.22* 0.28*** 1.09 1.45 1.21 1.42 0.62 0.89 0.42** 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001, relative frequencies (2018 vs. 2017)  
























requirement 0.79*** 0.95 0.83* 0.83* 1.45* 1.49* 1.42* 0.98 1 0.94 0.87* 




According to the Poisson regression results, employment of epidemiologist 
physicians according to the minimum requirement was the only personnel 
requirement which showed a significant correlation with the occurrence of infections. 
As anticipated, coefficients showed a reduction in the risk of infections for most 
types of pathogens investigated. When meeting additional minimum requirements, a 
reduction is expected in the incidence density of CD, MRSA and MRP infections. 
When all minimum requirements are met at the same time, incidence densities of CD 
infections, MRSA infections and MRP infections reduced to approximately a third, a 
quarter and two fifths, respectively.  
Table 26 presents the coefficients of regression models investigating the correlation 
between the compliance with the minimum requirements and the size of the 
institution.  
Table 26. Correlation between compliance with the minimum requirements and 
the size of the institution (2017/2018) 
 At least one 
minimum 
requirement is met 
All minimum 




Model Logistic regression Logistic regression Ordered logit 
Annual days of care  1.000051* 0.999998 1.000003* 
(Annual days of 
care)
2
  1.000000* 1.000000 1.000000 
N 206 206 206 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001, relative frequencies  
 
As anticipated, coefficients showed a positive correlation with the annual number of 
days of care. Figures 18 and 19 present the estimated probabilities for different 
patient turnovers.  
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Figure 18. Probability of meeting at least one minimum requirement in relation 
to the days of care at 103 domestic institutions (2017–2018) 
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Figure 19. Minimum requirements met in relation to the days of care at 103 
domestic institutions (2017) 
 
III.4.5. Discussion and conclusions 
Our results confirmed both hypotheses: (H1) the incidence of hospital infections is 
lower in institutions where the minimum requirements of infection control are met. 
Meeting the requirement for hospital epidemiologist physician was correlated with a 
reduced incidence density of both CD, MRSA, Gram+ and symptomatic MRP 
infections. The more minimum requirements were met, the lower was the incidence 
density of CD, MRSA and MRP infections. The greatest decrease in infections was 
observed when all minimum requirements were met at the same time. Our results 
confirmed the second hypothesis (H2) as well, i.e., the savings achieved by a reduced 
number of cases will balance out the costs associated with meeting the minimum 
requirements in institutions with a higher patient turnover, therefore these institutions 
are more likely to comply with the minimum requirements. Among the investigated 
domestic institutions, the probability that none of the minimum requirements was 
implemented was the highest in institutions with the lowest patient turnover, while 
the number of minimum requirements met increased with the size of the institution. 
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In 2018, however, all of the minimum requirements were met in only 5 out of the 
103 institutions (4.8%), which is an alarmingly low rate.  
Our results, in accordance with international and Hungarian studies, confirmed that 
infection control measures are effective tools in reducing hospital infections [2, 3, 
30-32, 53, 54]. Several international studies demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of 
infection control measures [19, 21, 25, 55-57], which is consistent with the second 
hypothesis of our research, i.e. when cost-effectiveness is considered, larger 
institutions are more likely to meet minimum requirements. However, caution is 
required when interpreting the results of our research. Accurate knowledge of both 
the patient-level risk, as well as of the type and risk category of institution is 
especially important when interpreting hospital epidemiology data [30]. Furthermore, 
the development level of infection control activities affects the accuracy of the 
reported data and the number of discovered cases, therefore changes can only be 
followed up reliably if well-established surveillance systems are in place [30].  
Further research questions rise due to the fact that only a small proportion of 
domestic inpatient institutions has met all minimum requirements of infection 
control. On the one hand, it should be investigated whether preventive and protective 
measures according to the international professional recommendations would prove 
cost-efficient from an institutional perspective in Hungary, or if their implementation 
is financially limited by current hospital reimbursement regulations. Additionally, 
research for creating an appropriate incentive system should assess which are the 
facilitating factors and limitations (within personal and institutional operations, as 
well as in the institutional structure) of implementing and efficiently operating 
infection control [58-60].  
III.5. Institutional costs of standard and spreading-based protective regulations 
against multidrug-resistant pathogens, according to international 
recommendations  
The following section is based on the following paper which has been accepted for 
publication: Kopcsone Nemeth, I., M. Péntek, and Z. Zrubka, Costs of infection 
control and special challenges during COVID-19 pandemic: experiences in a 
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military hospital. Academic and Applied Research in Military and Public 
Management Science, 2021. (accepted for publication) [61] 
III.5.1. Background 
The effectiveness of IC is supported by unequivocal scientific evidence. The 
resource demand and costs associated with the implementation of IC is a topic that 
has not been explored in detail in international literature. After reviewing the 
literature between 2000 and 2019, Nguemeleu et al. found seven papers which 
reported on an economical IC analysis [57]. Although the quality of these 
publications varied, overall, IC measures that follow the best practices lead to cost 
savings. In Canada, a cost-benefit calculation was made on a four-year regional IC 
program, which found that the program resulted in a 19% reduction in hospital 
infections with savings amounting to 9 million Canadian dollars [55]. A systematic 
literature review carried out by ECDC reviewed the health economic analyses of 
measures implemented to prevent hospital infections [62]. A total of 28 studies were 
identified, the majority of which were made in the USA. The authors concluded that 
European studies (e.g. United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Switzerland) do not 
provide a full-scale view on Europe. Differences between regions and countries (like 
the health status of the population, economical development status of the country, 
differences in health services) warrant analyses based on local data [63]. 
In Hungary, implementation of infection control activities into the NEAK 
reimbursement is being prepared. Our research is part of this process and has been 
carried out within the framework of and with financial support provided by the 
project EFOP 1.8.0-VEKOP-17-2017-00001 “Professional and Methodological 
Development of Healthcare System”, sub-project D.V. “Changing the Organisational 
Culture, Patient Safety Culture Sub-project 4. Integration of infection Control 
activities into the NEAK reimbursement”. 
This research is intended to specify evidence-based IC funding requirements at an 
institutional-level and by appropriate methods. Within a pilot study, it assesses and 
evaluates the costs of the required practice at an institution where IC according to 
WHO guidelines has previously been implemented. Thereby it provides data for the 
clarification of estimated costs associated with the introduction of novel IC 
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methodologies and the personnel, material/device and financial resource 
requirements of the current institutional IC practices.  
When selecting the institution, a key criterion was that the previous professional 
practices of the hospital management and the expert in charge of the hospital’s 
infection control activities suggest that the implementation of national 
recommendations at the institutional level is expected to be as complete as possible, 
and practices are implemented at the required level. Building upon the results and 
experiences of the present pilot study we plan to extend it nationwide and to different 
types of institutions (primary, secondary, tertiary, specialised). 
III.5.2. Objectives 
The aim of the pilot research is to define the cost requirements of those procedures, 
proposed in methodology papers, which are part of the general operational costs of 
the hospital, and typically carried out at the bedside and as such cannot always be 
identified exactly based on the patient documentation.  
Hypothesis 
Different types of hospital departments and types of isolation require different 




Pilot study data collection took place during a one-week period between Monday, 30 
March 2020 and Sunday, 5 April at the MHEK, involving the following departments: 
a.) intensive care unit (ICU)  
b) perinatal intensive care centre (PIC)  
c) department of surgery  
d) department of internal medicine 
The survey was made for the NEAK in a manner attached to a care event of patients 
treated according to the authorisation defined in Decree 6/1998. (III. 11.) NM of the 
Minister for Public Welfare on the legal regulations governing the maintenance of 
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professional coding systems and reimbursement parameters applied in healthcare. 
Each patient who underwent in-patient care at the aforementioned departments was 
enrolled in the study, regardless of whether they were admitted before or during the 
7-day study period or if they were discharged during or after the study. 
IC activities 
Microbiological screening (laboratory tests), as well as IC activities intended for the 
detection and treatment of hospital MRP and CD infections are regulated by 
professional guidelines. All patients admitted to the hospital are treated in 
accordance with the basic IC requirements. Our study sample was divided into four 
IC groups according to measures (general and transmission mode based) applied to 
prevent the transmission of the infection:  
(1) standard care (also known as the usual isolation),  
(2) contact isolation,  
(3) isolation of droplet infection and  
(4) mixed isolation (droplet infection and contact) 
Standard care includes regular IC activities, including hand disinfection, use of 
personal protective equipment (gloves, gown, face mask, protective goggles) and 
disinfection of the frequently touched areas as per the guidelines. During contact 
isolation, these IC activities are performed more frequently and more extensively 
(e.g. surfaces are disinfected twice per day). In addition to these measures, the use of 
masks and protective gloves is always mandatory during isolation of a droplet 
infection. For mixed isolation a combination of these measures is applied. 
Resource utilisation measurement and cost calculation 
For the measurement and cost quantification of resources used in association with IC 
the so-called “bottom-up micro-costing” approach was applied [64]. This involves 
the recording of all items of point-of-care infection control activities (hand 
disinfection, isolation activities, disinfection activities) for all patients hospitalised in 
the specified organisational units within this one-week period of data collection. 
When selecting the items, one of the criteria was that they should be measurable. 
Events outside the point of care (e.g. operating room, lab) were not included in our 
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study (their costs will be estimated based on a protocol), just like pharmacological 
therapies. 
The following items were recorded for each patient at the four departments, 
according to the applied IC protocol (standard, contact, droplets, mixed): aseptic 
hand washing, alcohol-based hand rub, examination gloves, sterile gloves, protective 
gown, waterproof protective gown, protective face mask, surgical mask, surface 
disinfection and tool disinfection, textile cleaning and final disinfection upon 
discharge of the patient. Furthermore, further substantial additional data on infection 
control were recorded for the total department time (up to 30 days) of the observed 
patients during the observation period: 
The number of days in the study, as well as the type of isolation was recorded for 
each patient. Costs were estimated by the average inpatient hospitalization time of 
the MHEK ICU, PIC, Departments of Internal Medicine and Department of Surgery 
for the entire year of 2019 (pre-COVID).  
Data 
Standard and spreading-based isolation costs of infection control are estimated in this 
paper by the data provided by the MH EK departments, i.e. referring to the tertiary 
level care institution type. Scope of the available data is included in Table 27. 
Costs were calculated from the institution’s perspective. Unit costs were estimated 
by the weighed mean costs from the purchase prices and quantities reported by the 
institution. Average length and distribution of the care period were determined by the 




Table 27. Scope of data analysed in the pilot study 
Variable Category Explanation 
Department 1 Department of Internal 
medicine 
2 ICU (Intensive Care Unit) 
3 PIC (Perinatal Intensive Center) 
4 Department of Surgery 
Types of hospital departments 
that should be differentiated 
in terms of infection control 
Patient  Unique patient ID 
Hygienic hand washing Occasions / study period 
Unit price: 5 ml liquid soap per 
occasion  
With liquid soap 
Alcohol-based rub Occasions / study period 
Unit price: 5 ml alcohol-based 
disinfectant per occasion  
With alcoholic disinfectant 
Use of examination gloves Occasions / study period 
Unit price: 1 pair of examination 
gloves per occasion  
 
Use of sterile gloves Occasions / study period 
Unit price: 1 pair of sterile gloves 
per occasion 
 
Use of protective gown when 
contamination is expected 
Occasions / study period 
Unit price: 1 protective gown per 
occasion 
 
Use of protective gown for 
contact isolation 
Occasions / study period 
Unit price: 1 protective gown per 
occasion 
 
Use of face mask / mouth mask 
when aerosol splash is expected 
Occasions / study period 
Unit price: 1 face mask per 
occasion 
 
Use of face mask / mouth mask 
when droplet infection is 
expected 
Occasions / study period 
Unit price: 1 face mask per 
occasion 
 
Wiping the critical surface 
besides the patient’s bed 
Occasions / study period 
Unit price: 1 sterile wipe per 
occasion 
 
Wiping the critical surfaces on 
medical instruments 
Occasions / study period 
Unit price: 1 sterile wipe per 
occasion 
 
Handling/cleaning bed and 
other linens 
Occasions / study period 
Unit price: 1 sterile wipe per 
occasion 
 
Final disinfection Occasions / study period 
Unit price: 1 final disinfection per 
occasion 
 
Number of days of care Day Total duration of hospital 
care, up to 30 days 
Number of days spent in 
isolation 
Day Number of days spent in 
isolation out of the total 
hospital care 
Number of study days Day Number of days spent in 
isolation during the study 
Type of care 1 Standard 
2 Contact 
3 Droplet infection 
4 Mixed (contact + droplet 
infection) 
Type of isolation protocol 
applied depending on the type 





The case numbers, equipment use, time spent in the study and characteristics of 
inpatient care are analysed with descriptive methods. Taking into consideration the 
small sample size included in the study and that, due to the one week observation 
period, complete observation data covering the entire length of the isolation periods 
were not available for all patients involved in the study, a Monte-Carlo simulation 
was used for cost analysis [65]. We use the following formula for the cost analysis of 
each department and type of care:  
𝑘𝑖𝑜 = (∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑜𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
+ 𝑧𝑜) ∗ 𝑙𝑖𝑜 
Where k is the complete cost per patient in Type i isolation in Department Type o, 
qiot is the daily average frequency of use of Type t=1, 2...n cost item in the same 
location, dt is the average amount of Type t cost item used on a single occasion, pt is 
the unit price of Type t cost item, lio is the average number of days spent in Type i 
isolation in Department o (which is equal to the average length of care in said 
Department of the patient receives standard care), and zo is the average projected 
daily cost of final disinfection based on the average length of care in each 
Department.  
In the simulated sample, the parameters q, d, p and l followed a gamma distribution 
based on the measured average and standard deviation of the sample, e.g. q ~ 
(,), where 𝛼 =
𝜇2
𝑠2
 and 𝛽 =
𝜇
𝑠2
,  is the daily average consumption of the given 
cost item and s is the standard deviation of the daily consumption of the cost item. 
Similarly, p ~ (,), where 𝛼 =
𝜇2
𝑠2
 and 𝛽 =
𝜇
𝑠2
,  is the average unit price of the 







,  is the average length of time spent in isolation, and s is the standard 
error of the isolation period. The gamma distribution ensures that both the amounts 
and the prices only assume positive values. Based on expert estimation a standard 
error corresponding to 10% of the average value was applied only to liquid soap and 
alcohol-based disinfectant among the average amounts used per occasion (dt). 
Considering that unit prices (pt) can demonstrate significant variations due to market 
processes and the institution-specific procurement policies, based on expert 
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estimation a standard error corresponding to 20% of the average value was applied to 
these parameters. To estimate the standard error of days spent in isolation (lio), we 
used the overall patient turnover date of the institution and based our calculations on 
the average (o), longest (maxo) and shortest (mino) care periods and annual patient 
turnover (no) to devise the following formula based on the assumption that taking 
into consideration a yearly patient turnover volume of several thousands the observed 





The distribution of cost items was determined using a simulated sample of 100,000-
100,000 subjects generated with the method of Cholesky decomposition that applied 
the correlation structure of the frequency of each intervention. For each department 
and isolation type we calculated the average costs and 95% confidence intervals (2.5-
97.5 percentile range of simulated data) estimated from the simulated distribution. 
The comparison of the costs of each department and care types and thus the testing of 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) was performed with a paired Welch’s t-test based on the average 
and standard deviation of the simulated sample and the observed item number of 
subgroups in the sample.  
III.5.4. Results 
Over a 7-day observation period data from 84 patients were recorded (Internal 
Medicine: n=16; ICU: n=32, PIC: n=22, and Surgery: n=14). Standard care was 
provided to 64 patients (279 observation days) and 20 patients were in isolation for a 
total of 64 observation days (contact isolation: n=13, droplet infection: n=1; and 
mixed: n=6). Overall, 7, 7, 2 and 4 patients isolated in the Internal Medicine 
Department, ICU, PIC and Surgery Department, respectively, provided data for our 
study. The average observation period per patient was 4.4 (2.2) days for standard 
care and 4.0 (2.8) days for isolation. The parameters used for cost estimates are 
summarised in Table 28. The estimated costs are presented in Table 29. 
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on a single 
occasion 
SE of amount 









  20.64 1.22 26.12 2.98 1.72 0.17 3 ml 0.30 
Use of examination gloves
c
 26.14 1.42 28.83 4.37 5.12 0.51 2 pcs
f
 - 
Use of sterile gloves
c
 0.63 0.12 2.36 1.82 35.48 3.55 2 pcs - 
Protective gown (contamination) 1.33 0.22 4.03 1.36 143.82 14.38 1 pc - 
Protective gown (contact isolation) 0.61 0.20 8.77 1.55 143.82 14.38 1 pc - 
Full face mask (aerosol splash) 2.93 0.51 8.44 3.22 400.94 40.09 1 pc - 
Full face mask (droplet infection) 7.42 0.82 12.70 1.95 4.30 0.43 1 pc - 
Wiping down critical surfaces 
(bedside) 
1.82 0.18 2.44 0.83 21.40 2.14 1 pc - 
Wiping down instruments 3.11 0.25 7.36 2.42 21.40 2.14 1 pc - 
Handling/cleaning bed and other 
linens 
1.57 0.14 3.79 0.84 663.00 66.30 1 occ.
g
 0.10 
Final disinfection (Internal 
Medicine, Surgery) 
- - - - 6800.00 680.00 1 occ. - 
Final disinfection (ICU, PIC) - - - - 19,800.00 1980.00 1 occ. - 
a
Soap and water or other disinfecting detergent; 
b















Table 29. Parameters used for cost estimates 
  
Department of internal 
medicine ICU PIC Department of surgery 
Standard care Daily average cost (HUF); average [95CI
a
] 3809 
[3136 - 4596] 
8589 
[7190 - 10178] 
4089 
[3399 - 4882] 
4539 
[3818 - 5361] 
 Care period (HUF); average [95CI] 9.1 
[8.9 - 9.3] 
3.6 
[3.1 - 4.1] 
19.3 
[18.3 - 20.3] 
4.6 
[4.4 - 4.8] 
 Total cost (HUF); average [95CI] 34,663 
[28,529 - 41,819] 
30,824 
[26,159 - 35,920] 
78,904 
[65,354 - 94,615] 
20,875 
[17,538 - 24,677] 
Isolation Daily average cost (HUF); average [95CI] 9203 
[5561 - 14,190] 
11200 
[7441 - 16,254] 
9265 
[5614 - 14,270] 
9413 
[5753 - 14,419] 
 Care period (HUF); average [95CI] 11.4 
[10.6 - 12.2] 
7.8 
[5.8 - 10.1] 
30.6 
[23.9 - 38.1] 
8.5 
[7.3 - 9.8] 
 Total cost (HUF); average [95CI] 104,907 
[63,023 - 162,334] 
86,935 
[55,120 - 132,809] 
282,892 
[163,214 - 453,760] 
79,996 
[47,998 - 124,730] 
Isolation vs. standard 
care 
Incremental cost / day (HUF); average 
[95CI] 
5393 
[5379 - 5407] 
2612 
[2597 - 2626] 
5176 
[5162 - 5190] 
4875 
[4861 - 4889] 
 Incremental cost / patient (HUF); average 
[95CI] 
61,488 
[57,109 - 66,016] 
20,363 
[15,107 - 26,393] 
158,216 
[123,584 - 197,043] 
41,452 
[35,471 - 47,857] 
a
95CI: 95% confidence interval (2.5–97.5 percentiles of simulated distribution) 
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Tables 30-35 present the results of comparison of individual costs between different 
departments and the results of the comparison between standard care and isolation 
care costs in each department.  
Table 30. Comparison of the daily average cost of standard care between 
different departments of the hospital 










3809 371 9 0.000 0.079 0.001 
ICU 8589 766 25 - 0.000 0.000 
PIC 4089 379 20 - - 0.008 
Department of 
surgery 
4539 394 10 - - - 
Table 31. Comparison of the average cost of standard care per patient between 
different departments of the hospital 










34,663 3388 9 0.009 0.000 0.000 
ICU 30,824 2492 25 - 0.000 0.000 
PIC 78,904 7464 20 - - 0.000 
Department of 
surgery 
20,875 1826 10 - _ - 
Table 32. Comparison of the daily average cost of isolation care between 
different departments of the hospital 











9203 2222 7 0.035 0.945 0.839 
ICU 11,200 2266 7 - 0.006 0.047 
PIC 9265 2223 2 - - 0.865 
Department of 
surgery 
9413 2228 4 - - - 
 
Table 33. Comparison of the average cost of isolation care per patient between 
different departments of the hospital 










104,907 25,597 7 0.080 0.000 0.031 
ICU 86,935 20,017 7 - 0.000 0.362 
PIC 282,892 75,127 2 - - 0.000 
Department of 
surgery 
79,996 19,740 4 - - - 
Table 34. Comparison of the daily average cost of standard care and isolation 
care between different departments of the hospital 
 





















3809 371 9 9203 2222 7 0.001 
ICU 8589 766 25 11,200 2266 7 0.022 
PIC 4089 379 20 9265 2223 2 0.185 
Department of 
surgery 
4539 394 10 9413 2228 4 0.021 
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Table 35. Comparison of the daily average cost of standard care and isolation 
care between different departments of the hospital 
 





















34,663 3388 9 104,907 25,597 7 0.000 
ICU 30,824 2492 25 86,935 20,017 7 0.000 
PIC 78,904 7464 20 282,892 75,127 2 0.161 
Department of 
surgery 
20,875 1826 10 79,996 19,740 4 0.009 
 
III.5.5. Discussion, conclusions 
Our research has produced cost estimates of isolation care in different departments of 
the MH EK. Based on our results, depending on the type of department the daily cost 
of standard care was in the HUF 3,809-8,589 range while the daily cost of isolation 
care was in the range of HUF 9,203-11,200. Daily costs were highest in the ICU and 
lowest in the Department of Internal Medicine. The total cost was highest in the PIC 
due to the longest inpatient care and isolation (standard care: HUF 20,875-78,904, 
highest level of isolation: HUF 79,996-282,892). The incremental isolation cost per 
patient compared to standard care was in the range of HUF 20,363-158,216. 
Therefore, our results provide support for our hypothesis that the cost of IC control is 
significantly different depending on the type of hospital department. 
The scientific literature includes only a few high quality publications discussing the 
costs of IC. According to a systematic literature review that included data published 
up to 2011, there was only a single publication that applied a micro-costing method 
beyond providing detailed descriptions of all the pertinent input data [66], therefore 
the present results are relevant at the international level. In particular, there is also a 
paucity of research studies performed in Hungary. Our research has produced an 
estimate of HUF 178,404 – 507,046 for the incremental cost of CDI (see 
Section III.3.). 
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The strength of our research is based on performing our survey in an institution with 
a well-functioning IC surveillance system. Therefore it is reasonable to presume that 
our results reflect the costs of good IC practice in terms of both guidelines and 
everyday practice and, consequently, they can be successfully used in other 
institutions to provide good estimates for the costs of introducing IC. However, when 
translating the results the structure of other institutions must be taken into account 
because overall institutional costs are highly dependent on cost differences between 
departments. There are limitations on our research including the relatively small 
patient sample included in the analysis. The simulation used for our analysis allowed 
more accurate estimates by combining care periods derived from a large patient 
sample and daily equipment use data derived from a small sample size; however, a 
statistical comparison of the results once again calls for further assumptions. In our 
study the subgroups were compared while taking into account the low sample sizes 
of the original sample, and since no significant results were detected even in the case 
of the PIC, we conclude that a large sample would be needed to produce more 
accurate data.  
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IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
IV.1. Main findings of the research projects 
1. Our research performed in the PIC of the MH EK has confirmed that the 
German NEO-KISS protocol can be efficiently used within the framework of 
the Hungarian national health care system, is able to measure the quality 
indicator and in particular the infection control indicators of pre-term care, 
and the prevalence of serious nosocomial infections is comparable to (does 
not exceed) the German data. Since national reference data are not available, 
the published NEO-KISS reference data can be used to very accurately assess 
the care and infection control practices of each PIC department and 
additionally serve as objective index data for the improvement of the quality 
of care. 
2. Additionally, our experiments involving personnel in the PIC of the MH EK 
have confirmed that a combination of targeted educational tools and 
innovative technology (an instrument providing visual feedback) can 
successfully teach proper hand disinfection technique. The amount of 
disinfectant per occasion used by the research subjects had a significant effect 
on the results (3 mL was the threshold value where almost all personnel 
achieved successful hand disinfection), but the extra costs of disinfectant 
usage measured in parallel with the improvement of hand hygiene 
compliance seem insignificant when compared to the costs of the potential 
infections avoided.  
3. We were the first to demonstrate that in Hungary (in 2011) a case of CDI has 
increased care costs by an average of HUF 100 to 200 thousand. The 
incremental cost of CDI is estimated to be in the range of HUF 130–
150 thousand for each hospital admission due to CDI and this cost increases 
to HUF 400–500 thousand/patient/year in cases of multiple CDI episodes. 
The cost is greatly dependent on the duration of care and the time (measured 
in minutes per day) of direct care provided to the CDI patient.  
4. As demonstrated by our overview analysis of the fulfilment of minimum IC 
requirements in Hungarian hospitals, institutions that fulfil minimum 
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requirements have lower prevalences of nosocomial infections. The greatest 
decrease in infections was observed when all minimum requirements were 
met at the same time. The number of fulfilled requirements increased with the 
size of the institution. In 2018, however, all of the minimum requirements 
were met in only 5 out of the 103 institutions (4.8%), which is a very low 
rate. In institutions with large patient turnover the savings achieved through 
the decrease in the number of events balance out the costs associated with 
meeting the minimum requirements.  
5. We have demonstrated that the institutional implementation of IPC is 
accompanied by excess costs which can significantly vary according to 
department type – these costs are highest in the PIC and lowest in the 
Department of Internal Medicine.  
IV.2. The practical significance and public policy relevance of our research 
results 
Our research projects have provided significant proof for the clinical effectiveness of 
IC activities and for the feasibility of implementing institutional IC practice in a real-
life practice environment in Hungary. Our results on the costs associated with CD 
infections and the implementation of IPC are especially important because there is a 
dearth of such data from both Hungary and the surrounding region. The results of our 
study provide essential input data for healthcare economy analyses based on local IC 
data and practice. 
Infection control and related research studies are of particular importance to public 
policy and public financing, especially under the current situation. As is the case with 
other healthcare services, infection control is also subject to investigation of the areas 
covered by its related activities, the resulting public benefits and the particulars of 
the associated cost drivers. In general, research should also analyse the distributions 
of costs assumed by the individual, the insurer and the wider society. 
Stiglitz took an unambiguous stance supporting the necessity and importance of state 
intervention in the area of healthcare. According to his position, the aim of healthcare 
policies (in addition to other activities) should be to devise a patient-oriented, 
efficient and sustainable financed healthcare system targeted to influencing health-
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associated risk factors. Stiglitz believes that efforts must be made to utilize the 
available scarce resources to maximise societal benefits (such as the improvement of 
health status) [67]. Stiglitz discusses at length that the healthcare sector has 
numerous market failures necessitating governmental intervention, including among 
the most pertinent topics such as the meritorious nature of goods, the information 
asymmetry, the problem of public goods, externalities, and the limited competition in 
healthcare [67]. 
It must be emphasised that information asymmetry which is one of the central tenets 
of economics and microeconomics is an important factor in healthcare in general and 
especially important in infection control in particular. Information asymmetry means 
that healthcare providers, healthcare customers and financing entities have different 
up-to-date information available to them and consequently their knowledge and 
attitudes also assume these differences, and healthcare customers are forced to rely 
on the knowledge and decisions of physicians and other healthcare professionals 
[67].  
The control of information asymmetry is in the interest of all participants of the 
healthcare sector as well as those of healthcare customers and there are efforts from 
both sides; however, these efforts to decrease information asymmetry are stymied by 
the lack of information about the existence of scientific proof and valid theoretical 
basis of the services and the benefits (in terms of quality and health gains) and 
economic implications of the implementations of procedures. This makes 
comparison (of cost, quality and efficacy) and benchmarking and ultimately effective 
governance and management difficult if not impossible. Stiglitz also emphasises the 
significance and practical difficulties of making comparisons in the healthcare sector 
(due to significantly different profiles of hospitals, different patient populations, 
geographical location and financing factors) [67].  
He draws attention to the fact that since competition between service providers such 
as hospitals is rather limited is it unreasonable to expect that service providers with 
efficient, high quality care would gain competitive advantage over providers with 
lower quality or more expensive services. For example, many regions or 
municipalities are only served by a single healthcare provider, e.g. a single hospital 
[67]. Stiglitz writes: “Imperfect information decreases the effective degree of 
competition”. “By the same token, the heterogeneity of medical services makes price 
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and quality comparisons difficult and thus inhibits the effective dissemination of 
information.” [67]. “The practices of the medical profession may compound the 
inevitable limitations of competition resulting from imperfect information.” [67]. 
“The majority of hospitals [...] are no-for-profit institutions” [67].  
For this reason, in Hungary, similar to other countries, the provider and financing 
entities of healthcare services strive to measure quality and costs, and additionally, 
pay increasing attention to measure at the level of individual patients or patient 
groups the health gains patients derive from hospital care, because the financing 
entities increasingly turn from purchasing healthcare services to “purchasing” certain 
kinds of “results”. 
The results of the research projects presented in this thesis provide input for the 
multi-modal strategy of the implementation of IC in Hungary. The successful 
implementation of institutional IC programs requires a combination of operating 
effective surveillance systems, use of appropriate professional guidelines, training for 
personnel, ensuring personnel and financial requirements, continuous monitoring and 
feedback of the results, and finally, the continuous communication of the IC 
approach [33]. The results demonstrate that appropriate data collection and analysis 
are feasible under the conditions of Hungarian healthcare, and similarly to 
international experience, operating IC programs based on evidence promoting a 
decrease in the number of infections can be successfully ensured. At the same time, 
the dismantling of economic, personnel and organisational barriers shall require 
additional efforts. One of the important element in this respect is the comprehensive 
cost-effectiveness analysis of infection control, and the implementation of its results 
in Hungarian inpatient care facilities and the development of financing and incentive 
system matched to the characteristics of each institution.  
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V. SUMMARY 
Healthcare associated infections and in particular, infections caused by multidrug-
resistant pathogens are one of the major challenges of modern healthcare systems. 
Data from Hungary are less favourable compared to the European average, therefore 
antimicrobial resistance poses a particular public health problem.  
The objective of infection control is the prevention of healthcare associated 
infections, a process that requires complex institutional quality and change 
management. The institution-level implementation of infection control consists of 
continuous data collection and monitoring, and supplying appropriate institutional 
and financial conditions.  
In Hungary the volume of routine data collection supporting short and long term 
public health financing decisions is currently much less than would be required and 
both the quality and quantity of available data are inadequate.  
This thesis examines the components of the multi-modal implementation strategy of 
institution-level infection control and in particular their economic aspects and 
therefore supplies research results that are unique not only in Hungary but in all of 
East-Central European region. Since data transferability in the area of infection 
control effectiveness and costs is greatly limited (cost and effectiveness data do not 
translate from one country to the next) and legal provisions also dictate the use of 
local data, locally collected research data are particularly important for making 
appropriate evidence-based health policy and financing decisions.  
The results described here have highlighted that operation of surveillance systems 
that comply with international guidelines is feasible within the framework of 
Hungarian healthcare. While the implementation of good practices in line with 
international guidelines requires the provision of appropriate personnel and financial 
resources and training for personnel, the number of nosocomial infections can be 
decreased by implementing the institutional minimum requirements of infection 
control.  
The results provide cost data that can serve as the basis for further health economic 
analyses of related to infection control. Appropriate public policy decisions require 
the knowledge of specific costs. From the standpoint of public policy, these research 
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data are suitable for developing transparent management and long term financing in 
this area.  
Due to the varied characteristics of healthcare institutions we have measured 
different costs in different hospital departments. Financing decisions require 
performing analyses based on the individual characteristics of each department, 
which can potentially lead to optimal resource allocation and can promote the 
elimination of economic obstacles hindering the implementation of infection control 
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VIII.1. NEO-KISS Protocol  
Case definitions 
I. Primary bloodstream infections (secondary bloodstream infections are 
excluded) – Blood Stream Infection (BSI) 
1. Clinical sepsis (infection without an identifiable pathogen)  
All three of the following criteria are fulfilled: 
a) Antibiotic therapy for at least 5 days 
b) Blood culture was not performed or no pathogens were detected in blood 
culture 
c) No apparent infection can be verified at another site 
AND at least 2 criteria of the listed clinical signs: 
a) Fever (>38 °C) or temperature instability or hypothermia (<36.5 °C) 
b) Tachycardia (>200 /min) or new and/or worsening bradycardia (<80/min) 
c) Recapillarisation time >2 s 
d) New or worsening apnoea (>20 s) 
e) Unexplained metabolic acidosis (BE <-10 mmol/L) 
f) Emergence of new hyperglycaemia (>7.7 mmol/L) 
g) Other signs of sepsis (skin colour, biochemical signs, increased oxygen 
requirement – intubation, unstable general condition, apathy) 
2. Microbiologically verified bloodstream infection, not a coagulase negative 
Staphylococcus (CONS) 
If a pathogen is detected in one or more blood cultures of CSF and the pathogen is 
not CONS  
AND at least 2 criteria of the listed clinical signs and symptoms are present: 
a) Fever (>38 °C) or temperature instability or hypothermia (<36.5 °C) 
b) Tachycardia (>200 /min) or new and/or worsening bradycardia (<80/min) 
c) Recapillarisation time >2 s 
d) New or worsening apnoea (>20 s) 
e) Unexplained metabolic acidosis (BE <-10 mmol/L) 
f) Emergence of new hyperglycaemia (>7.7 mmol/L) 
g) Other signs of sepsis (skin colour, biochemical signs, increased oxygen 




3. Microbiologically verified bloodstream infection caused solely by CONS 
Presence of CONS is verified in at least 1 blood culture or IV device AND at least 
1 of the following criteria 
a) CRP >20 mg/L 
b) Ratio of immature/total neutrophil granulocytes >0.2 (CBC shows left 
shift in excess of 20%) 
c) Thrombocytopenia (<100,000/µL) 
d) Leukocytopenia (<5000/µL) 
AND at least 2 criteria of the listed clinical signs and symptoms are present: 
a) Fever (>38 °C) or temperature instability or hypothermia (<36.5 °C) 
b) Tachycardia (>200/min) or new and/or worsening bradycardia (<80/min) 
c) Recapillarisation time >2 s 
d) New or worsening apnoea (>20 s) 
e) Unexplained metabolic acidosis (BE <-10 mmol/L) 
f) Emergence of new hyperglycaemia (>7.7 mmol/L) 
g) Other signs of sepsis (skin colour, biochemical signs, increased oxygen 
requirement – intubation, unstable general condition, apathy) 
 
 
II. Pneumonia (PNEU) 
At least one of the following radiological signs: 
a) New or progressive infiltrate  
b) Consolidation 
c) Fluid in the interlobar fissures and/or the pleural space  
AND worsening gas exchange or sudden oxygenation disorder  
AND at least four of the following clinical signs and symptoms: 
Temperature instability 
a) New or worsening tachycardia (>200/min) or bradycardia (<80/min) 
b) New or worsening tachypnoea (>60/min) or apnoea (> 20 s) 
c) New or worsening dyspnoea (retractions, nasal flaring, moaning) 
d) Increased volume of airway secretions and increased need for evacuation 
of airway secretions 
e) Purulent discharge in trachea 
f) Pathogen isolated from airway secretions 
g) CRP >20 mg/L 
h) Ratio of immature/total neutrophil granulocytes >0.2 (CBC shows left 





III. Necrotizing enterocolitis (NEC) 
A combination of clinical and radiological signs or a histological diagnosis (this is 
sufficient by itself) and one of the following criteria: 
a) Pneumoperitoneum 
b) Intramural bowel gas 
c) Fixed loop (extended bowel loop filled with gas that appears in unchanged 
form in several consecutive X-rays)  
AND two of the listed signs and symptoms are present and cannot be explained by 
anything else: 
a) Vomiting 
b) Abdominal bloating 
c) Residue before feeding 
d) Erythema on the lower abdomen 
e) Repeated occult or visible blood in the faeces OR histologically confirmed 
NEC (this is sufficient by itself) 
 
 
Specifications of interventions 
CVC (central venous 
catheter) 
Number of days when the CVC is inserted and remains in the 
patient for more than 12 hours. Umbilical catheters and flow-
directed catheters are included 
PVC (peripheral 
venous catheter) 
Number of days when the PVC is inserted and remains in the 
patient for more than 12 hours. If CVC was also placed at the 
same time then these days are to be counted as CVC days and 




Number of days when the patient spent more than 12 hours 




Number of days when the patient spent more than 12 hours on 
CPAP. If the patient was also intubated, then the days are to be 
indicated under that category 
Antibiotics 
Number of days when the patient was administered parenteral 
antibiotic or systemic antibiotic via oral route 
Antimycotics, antiviral agents and locally administered 




VIII.2. Data sheet for point-of-care infection control interventions 
Department 
code: 
         Department name: 
Ward...../Bed..... 
.../02/2020 Shift number/Page 
number: ….. /… 
Patient name code: Social Security Number: Registration number:  
Total score from individual risk assessment: 
Type of care  ⎕ Standard ⎕ Contact ⎕ Droplet infect. ⎕ Mix (C+DI) 
  
Surveillance data of applied measures 
Hand disinfection 
Visible contamination – 
hygienic hand washing  
Patient care – alcohol-based hand rub  
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
When examination gloves 
are put on/removed 
When sterile gloves are put on/removed 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
  
Protective gown Due to expected When contact isolation is used 
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contamination 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 







Due to expected aerosol 
splash 
Protection against droplet infection 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 





Bed  Medical devices 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
  
Handling/cleaning 
bed and other 
linens 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
  
Final disinfection ⎕⎕⎕⎕⎕ 
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Instructions for completing the log 
1. Personal identification code 
Social Security Number or other appropriate 
type identification. 
2. Health service ID (Master number) 
The patient’s 9 digit master number. 
3. Department identifier 
9 character code of the provider department 
stated on the financing agreement. 
3/A. Specialty/activity code 
Code of the specialty providing care for the 
patient. 
4. Date 
Patient care day (year, month and day) when 
the infection control activities were observed. 
5. Individual risk 
6. Type of care 
1. Standard 
2. Contact 
3. Droplet infection 
4. MIX (contact + droplet infection) 
7. Quantification of the applied measures – 
Hand disinfection 
7/A. Visible contamination – quantification 
of hygienic hand washing 
Quantity of activity on patient care day (pcs). 
7/B. Quantification of alcohol-based hand 
rub 
Quantity of activity on patient care day 
(number of times). 
7/C. Quantity of protective gloves put 
on/removed 
Quantity used on patient care day (pcs). 
 8. Quantity of protective gowns  
8/A. Quantity of protective gowns - expected 
contamination, on given patient care day 
Quantity used on patient care day (pcs). 
8/B. Quantity of protective gowns - contact 
isolation 
Quantity used for contact isolation on patient care 
day (pcs). 
9. Quantity of full face/surgical masks 
9/A. Qty. of full face/surgical masks – 
Expected aerosol splash. 
Quantity used on patient care day (pcs). 
9/B. Qty. of full face/surgical masks – Droplet 
infection 
Quantity used on patient care day (pcs) 
10. Wiping down critical surfaces 
Critical surfaces include all surfaces in the 
patient’s environment touched by the patient or 
the care personnel in the course of care 
administration (bed and accessories, bedside 
table, control panels of medical devices, etc.) 
10/A. Wiping down critical surfaces (decon.) – 
Quantity – Bed 
Quantity of activity on patient care day (number 
of times). 
10/B. Wiping down critical surfaces (decon.) – 
Quantity – Medical device 
Quantity of activity on patient care day (number 
of times). 
11. Handling/cleaning bed and other linens 
(Quantity) 
Calculated quantity of bed linen and other linens 
exchanged on patient care day as part of IC 
activities. 
12. Final disinfection 
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 The completed disinfection after the patient’s 




VIII.3. Infection control DATA SHEET 
 
Observation unit: Patient care event in the department associated with the period of 
patient examination.  
It serves to collate summary data from sheets 7.1.-7.3 of the Data sheet filled out in 
the course of patient care administered in the department. In addition to the above 
data, selected data (isolation, screening tests, and results) highly significant for 
infection control are added here. 
 
Instructions for completing the Data sheet: 
a. The identification data must be identical to those on the Hospital data sheet.  
b. Data from daily infection control activities at the point-of-care summarised as 
part of Section 7.1 of the Data sheet are to be entered into the appropriate 
Sections (4 through 12). 
This part of the Data sheet can be repeated according to the number of 
observed days of the individual patient (up to 14 days when data are recorded 
in the Excel table) 
c. Data in Section 7.2 (Individual risk assessment) are to be entered on the 
type 13 line. For a case observed in a hospital ward up to 5 repetitions are 
allowed.   
d. Data in Section 7.3 (Priority risk assessment) are to be entered on the type 14 
line. For a case observed in a hospital ward up to 5 repetitions are allowed.   
e. Lines with 14 and 15 identifiers contain additional infection control data and 
their evaluation is also a priority. Must be determined using the patient’s 
documentation or the HIS system.  Pertinent data include screening type 
laboratory tests due to priority risk, test results, total duration spent in 
isolation, and completed aseptic interventions. The individual data items can 
be repeated – according to current plans the number of allowable repeats shall 





1. Personal identification code:          
2. Health service ID 
(Master number):          
3. /A Department identifier:          3/B. Specialty/activity code:     
Daily infection control activities completed at the point-of-care (up to 14) 
4. Date:         
5. Individual risk:   
6. Type of care:  
7. Quantity of hand disinfection 
7/A. Visible contamination – quantity of hygienic hand washing:    
7/B. Quantity of alcohol-based hand rub:    
7/C. Protective gloves put on/removed:    
7/D. Sterile gloves put on/removed:    
8. Quantity of protective gowns 
8/A. Quantity of protective gowns – on the patient care day, due to expected contamination:    
8/B. Quantity of protective gowns – for contact isolation:    
9. Quantity of full face/surgical masks 
9/A. Expected quantity full face mask / surgical masks in case of aerosol splash:    
9/B. Expected quantity full face mask / surgical mask in case of droplet infection:    
10. Wiping down critical surfaces (quantity) 
10/A. Wiping down critical surfaces (decon.)  Bed:    
10/B. Face Wiping down critical surfaces (decon.)   medical devices:    
11. Handling/cleaning bed and other linens (Quantity) 
Handling/cleaning bed and other linens:    
12. Final disinfection 
Final disinfection:  
Individual risk assessment 
13. Healthcare-associated infection – risk analysis (up to 5) 
Date of risk assessment: A B C D F G H I J K L M N P R S E 
                             
14. MRP/CDI infection risk analysis (up to 5) 
Date of risk assessment: A B C D F G H I J K L M N P E 
                           
Supplementary data 
15. Screening tests (up to 5) 
Description: A B OENO code: Date of sampling: Results received (date): F 
                         
16. Aseptic interventions (up to 40) 
Description: Date of intervention: OENO code: Qty. 
                
17. Isolation (up to 5) 
Description: A Start of isolation: End of isolation: 
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Purpose of test according to microorganisms 
Name                  Code 
 MRSA                                1 
 CRE                                   2  
 MPAE                               3  
 VRE                                   4 
 MACI                                5 
 ESBL-producing             6 
Enterobacterale 




OENO code of screening test 
Identical to the intervention code applied to medical interventions in the Accounting 
Report of Outpatient Care.  
Instructions for completing the log 
1. Personal identification code 
Social Security Number or other appropriate 
type identification. 
2. Health service ID (Master number) 
The patient’s 9 digit master number. 
3. Department identifier 
9 character code of the provider department 
stated on the financing agreement. 
3/A. Specialty/activity code 
Code of the specialty providing care for the 
patient. 
Daily infection control activities completed 
at the point-of-care (up to 14) 
To determine the cost, an itemised survey of 
infection control activities for all patient care 
days of all patients in a given organisational 
unit must be prepared for the defined time 
period. The defined survey period is 14 days, 
therefore daily infection control activities 
completed at the point-of-care for up to 
14 patient care days can be entered. 
4. Date 
Patient care day (year, month and day) when 
the infection control activities were observed. 
5. Individual risk 
In all inpatient departments, when admitting 
patients the risk assessment and evaluation of 
healthcare-associated infection must be 
completed within 72 hours of the time of 
admission; additional risk assessment and 
evaluation must be carried out upon patient 
transfer in both the transferring and the 
admitting institution, monthly during 
extended patient care, if there is a significant 
change in the risk factors of the patient such 
as catheter removal or insertion, wound 
formation, fever, etc. The score of risk 
assessment must be calculated. 
6. Type of care 
1. Standard 
2. Contact 
3. Droplet infection 
4. MIX (contact + droplet infection) 
7. Quantity of hand disinfection 
7/A. Visible contamination – quantity of 
hygienic hand washing 
Quantity of activity on patient care day 
(number of times). 
 7/B. Quantity of alcohol-based hand rub 
Quantity of activity on patient care day (number 
of times). 
7/C. Protective gloves put on/removed – 
Quantity 
Quantity used on patient care day (pcs). 
7/D. Protective gloves put on/removed – 
Quantity 
Quantity used on patient care day (pcs). 
8. Quantity of protective gowns 
8/A. Quantity of protective gowns – on  the 
patient care day, due to expected 
contamination 
Quantity used on patient care day (pcs). 
8/B. Quantity of protective gowns – for contact 
isolation 
Quantity used for contact isolation on patient care 
day (pcs). 
9. Quantity of full face/surgical masks 
9/A. Qty. of full face/surgical masks - Due to 
expected aerosol splash 
Quantity used on patient care day (pcs)” 
9/B. Qty. of full face/surgical masks - in case of 
droplet infection 
Quantity used on patient care day (pcs).” 
10. Wiping down critical surfaces 
Critical surfaces include all surfaces in the 
patient’s environment touched by the patient or 
the care personnel in the course of care 
administration (bed and accessories, bedside 
table, control panels of medical devices, etc.) 
10/A. Wiping down critical surfaces (decon.) – 
Bed 
Quantity of activity on patient care day (number 
of times). 
10/B. Wiping down critical surfaces (decon.) - 
Medical devices 
Quantity of activity on patient care day (number 
of times). 
11. Handling/cleaning bed and other linens 
(Quantity) 
Calculated quantity of bed linen and other linens 
exchanged on patient care day as part of IC 
activities. 
12. Final disinfection 
The completed disinfection after the patient’s 
discharge is to be denoted with the character “1”. 
Instructions for completing the log 
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Individual risk assessment 
13. Healthcare-associated infection – Risk 
assessment (up to 5) 
During the period of patient care in the 
department up to 5 risk assessments for 
healthcare-associated infection can be 
entered. 
Date of risk assessment 
Time (hours and minutes) when risk 
assessment for healthcare-associated infection 
was carried out. 
Risk factor qualification 
If the patient has a certain risk factor it is to 
be denoted with code 1, otherwise enter code 
0. 
Urinary catheter exposure during current 
hospitalisation (A) 
Central venous catheter exposure during 
current hospitalisation (B) 
Mechanical ventilation exposure during 
current hospitalisation (C) 
Admitting patient from intensive therapy 
department or intense care during current 
hospitalisation (D) 
Weakened immunity, immunodeficiency 
(F) 
Premature infant (G) 




Decompensated chronic condition (L) 
Multiple organ failure (M) 
Antibiotics exposure within the last 3 
months (N) 
Surgical intervention within the last 12 
months (P) 
Minimum of 1 night stay in a healthcare 
institution during the past 12 months (R) 
Smoking (S) 




 14. MRP/CDI infection – Risk assessment (up 
to 5) 
During the period of patient care in the 
department up to 5 risk assessments for 
MRP/CDI infection can be entered. 
Date of risk assessment 
Time (hours and minutes) when risk assessment 
for MRP/CDI infection was carried out. 
Risk factor qualification 
If the patient has a certain risk factor it is to be 
denoted with code 1, otherwise enter code 0. 
Patient’s medical history includes infection or 
colonisation by a multidrug-resistant pathogen 
(MRP) (A) 
Patient’s medical history includes C. difficile 
(B) 
Intensive care during the path 12 months (C) 
Direct transfer from foreign hospital (D) 
Direct transfer from domestic inpatient 
institution / nursing home (F) 
Chronic dialysis within the last 12 months (G) 
Cancer and chemotherapy during the past 
12 months (H) 
Patient has symptoms suggestive of infection 
(e.g. fever or enteral symptoms) (I) 
Patient has an invasive device (e.g. urinary 
catheter, venous catheter, feeding tube) (J) 
Patient had a surgical intervention within the 
past 3 months (K) 
Antibiotic therapy currently or within the past 
4 weeks (L) 
Antacid therapy currently or within the past 
4 weeks (M) 
Epidemiological connection between know 






Instructions for completing the log 
Surgical intervention within the last 12 
months (P) 
Minimum of 1 night stay in a healthcare 
institution during the past 12 months (R) 
Smoking (S) 
Minimum of 1 night stay in a healthcare 
institution during the past 12 months (P) 





15. Screening tests (up to 5) 
For pre-operative patient s or high risk, 
appropriate microbiological screening tests 
according to hospital’s MRP screening 
protocol must be completed. During the 
period of patient care in the department up to 
5 screening tests can be entered. 
15/A Purpose of the tests 







6. ESBL-producing Enterobacterale 
7. CDI 
15/B Reason for test 
1. First screening 
2. Follow-up 
15/C OENO code of test 
OENO code of microbiological screening test. 
15/D Sampling time 
Date of microbiological sampling completed 
according to hospital’s MRP screening 
protocol. 
15/E Date of receipt of the test results 
Date of results of MRP screening. 






6. ESBL-producing Enterobacterale 
7. CDI 
 16. Aseptic interventions (max. 40) 
Aseptic interventions completed during the 
period of patient care in the department. Up to 40 
interventions can be entered during the period of 
patient care in the department. 
16/A Date of aseptic intervention 
The date of the aseptic intervention. 
16/B OENO code of aseptic intervention 
OENO code of aseptic interventions completed 
during the period of patient care in the 
department. 
16/ C Quantity of aseptic intervention 
The number of aseptic interventions performed. 
17. Isolation (up to 5) 
Isolation period during the period of patient care 
in the department. Up to 5 periods can be entered 
during the period of patient care in the 
department. 
17/A Type of isolation 
1. Contact 
2. Droplet infection 
3. MIX (contact + droplet infection) 
17/B Start of isolation 
Start date of isolation 
17/C End of isolation 
End date of isolation. 
 
 
